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Abstract
Human agents are extremely flexible in dealing with Natural Language instructions: they
are able both t o adapt the plan they are developing to the input instructions, and vice versa,
to adapt the input instructions t o the plan they are developing. Borrowing the term from
[Lewis, 19791, I call this two-way adaptation process accommodation.
In this proposal, I first define accommodation in the context of processing instructions.
I then provide evidence for the particular inferences I advocate, and for the further claim
that such inferences are directed by the goal to achieve which a certain action is performed.
The evidence I provide comes from my analysis of naturally occurring instructions, and in
particular of purpose clauses and of negative imperatives.
Finally, I propose a computational model of instructions able to support accommodation
inferences. Such model is composed of: a speaker / hearer model of imperatives, based on
the one presented in [Cohen and Levesque, 1990bl; an action representation formalism based
on a hybrid system, B la KRYPTON [Brachman et al., 1983a], whose primitives are those
proposed in [Jackendoff, 19901; and inference mechanisms that contribute to building the
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Chapter 1

Introduction
The problem of understanding and executing Natural Language instructions or commands is of
both theoretic and practical interest: theoretic, because it bears on cognitive theories of actions;
practical, because almost since the beginning of Computer Science there has been a desire t o
communicate with the computer in Natural Language, and have it execute commands.
Instructions are meant to affect behavior, namely, the actions the agent performs; many
researchers, among others Winograd [1972], Chapman [1991], Cohen and Levesque [1990b], Vere
and Bickmore [1990], Alterman et al. [1991], have been and are working on the problem of
mapping Natural Language instructions onto an agent's behavior. Many complex facets of
this problem have been addressed, for example identifying the intentions that the agent should
adopt as a result of a certain instruction, or computing temporal constraints among different
actions the agent has t o perform. However, an aspect that, strangely enough, no one has really
addressed is computing the objects of the intentions the agent adopts, namely, the actions to be
performed: in general, researchers have simply equated such objects with predicate-argument
structures extracted from the parsed input string. This may perhaps be correct when dealing
with simple positive imperatives, which constitute almost the whole of the instructions examined
in the literature. However, naturally occurring instructions are complex, and action descriptions
cannot just be extracted from them, but they need to be computed. As a case in point, consider:

Ex. 1

a ) Place a plank between two ladders.
b) Place a plank between two ladders to create a simple scafolcl.

In both a) and b), the action to be executed is ('place a plank between two ladders". However,
1.a would be correctly interpreted by placing the plank anywhere between the two ladders: this
shows that in b) the agent must be inferring the proper position for the plank from the expressed
goal "to create a simple scafold". Notice therefore that the goal an action is meant t o achieve
constrains the interpretation and / or execution of the action itself. Furthermore, notice how
flesible a human a.gent is, in that s/he can deal with action descriptions at different levels of
specificity without ally difficulty: s/he is able to adapt her knowledge t o the input, and vice
versa, to interpret the input instructions according to her knowledge.
I hope the previous example gives the reader a flavor for the three main points that I want
t o make in this proposal:

1. The actions an agent has t o perform when s/he is given instructions have to be computed

from the descriptions given in the instructions themselves, as opposed t o simply extracted
from such descriptions.
2. The goals that an agent is trying t o achieve guide this computation; many of these goals
are explicitly stated in the instructions themselves.

3. Action descriptions found in instructions can't be expected t o exactly match the knowledge
that an agent has about actions and their characteristics. Therefore, to model an agent interpreting instructions we need a flexible action representation, inference mechanisms that
can deal with actions descriptions at various levels of specificity, and that build a structure
of the agent's intentions that will help interpret the subsequent instructions. Borrowing
the term from [Lewis, 19791, I collectively call these inference processes accommodation.

1.1 Thesis Statement
More in detail, my claim is that

most instructions don't exactly mirror the agent's knowledge, but are understood by accommodating them in the context of the general plan the agent is considering; the agent's accommodation
process is guided by the goal(s) that s/he is trying to achieve. The concept of goal itself is pervasive i n NL instructions, and a NL system which interprets instructions must be able to recognize
and/or hypothesize goals, keep track of them, and use them in computing the description of the
action to be performed.
To show that my claim is justified:
1. I will illustrate my views on the agent's inference processes by means of the analysis
of naturally occurring data - in particular, the two constructions of purpose clauses
and negative imperatives. I will show what pragmatic functions they perform, and
what kind of inferences an agent has t o do to understand them.
2. I will show how the agent's inferences are directed by the notion of goal. This is
equally true when the agent interprets purpose clauses, that express goals explicitly;
or negative imperatives, whose correct interpretation is often constrained by the goal
in the context of which an action should not be performed.

To show that my claim is valid, I will discuss the consequences of such views for a computational model of instructions. I will propose t o develop a model consisting of
1. A speaker / hearer model of imperatives, based on the one presented in [Cohen and
Levesque, 1990bl.

2. A representation of actions, and of goals, that provides support t o perform the inferences I will discuss. I will propose that a hybrid system, B la KRYPTON [Brachman
et al., 19S3aI should be used, whose primitives are those that Ray Jackendoff proposes
in [I9901 for the semantic representation of verbs and actions.
'All the examples I will discuss are naturally occurring ones, unless otherwise noted.
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3. Inference mechanisms that contribute to building the structure of the intentions the plan graph - that the agent develops while interpreting instructions; the representation of such plan graph will also be discussed.

1.2

Outline of Proposal

In ch. 2, I develop my views on the process of understanding instructions: after reviewing some of
the approaches taken in the literature, I will define what I mean by accommodating instructions,
and how accommodation relates t o plan recognition. At the end of that chapter, I will restate
n ~ ymain claim, the way I will assess it, and the work I propose t o do.
Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted t o the analysis of the data, purpose clauses and negative imperatives, that provide evidence for the view of instructions put forward in ch. 2.
In ch. 3, I examine purpose clauses, showing how goals, that purpose clauses explicitly describe,
constrain the interpretation of action descriptions; and I describe which relations between the
two actions described respectively in the matrix and in the purpose clause are possible.
In ch. 4, I analyze negative imperatives. I show that there exist two classes of negative imperatives, that have different pragmatic functions. Negative imperatives provide further support t o
the claims that goals affect the interpretation of action descriptions, and that action descriptions
need t o be computed.
I conclude both chapters with some remarks on the consequences that the analysis of such data
has for a computational model of instructions.
In ch. 5, I will describe the steps I have already undertaken, and the work I propose to
do t o define a computational model of instructions: I will present the speaker / hearer model,
the action representation formalism, the inference processes that build the plan graph, and the
plan graph itself. In this chapter I will also describe the application context in which my work
is taking place, namely, the Animation from Natural Language project at the University of
Pennsylvania.
Ch. 6 is devoted t o summary and conclusions.

Chapter 2

On instruction understanding
The problem of understanding and executing Natural Language instructions can be looked at
from many different points of view: my particular interest lies in the inferences that an agent
performs upon being given instructions in Natural Language - NL for short. Actually, a more
correct characterization of such inferences would be "those that an agent may perform upon being
given NL instructions". I am using may because it is not clear how interpretation and execution
of instructions can be totally teased apart: namely, when are these inferences performed, when
the agent interprets the instruction, or only when he executes it? The point I want t o stress is
that there are inferences that an agent can perform without being yet engaged in carrying out
the instructions: these are the ones I would like to account for. I will elaborate on this point in
sec. 2.1.2.
Discussing inferences that the agent performs upon getting NL instructions clearly cannot be
done independently from one's general approach t o instruction understanding. Therefore, in the
following section, I will show what understanding instructions has been taken t o be by different
researchers, then I will start developing my own theory of underst anding instructions, based on
Lewis's notion of accommodation [Lewis, 19791.

2.1

Accommodating instructions

There are many different points of view from which the problem of interpreting and executing
instructions may be examined: they depend on different factors, among them whether the main
research goal is t o develop a cognitive theory of how humans interpret and execute instructions,
or to implement a working program; and the type of scenario in which instructions have to be
interpreted and executed. Clearly instructions are meant to affect behavior, namely, the actions
the agent performs; in turn, the choice of actions to perform depends on the goals the agent
adopts, and on the performance situation he finds himself in. Unfortunately, in the literature
one finds some confusion about how instructions relate to an agent's goals and actions. In the
following, I will try t o characterize existing approaches t o instruction understanding on the basis
of

1. whether an instruction is taken to be a description of an action to be performed, or a
pointer to one of the agent's internal routines: in the former case, the agent has to actively
compute the object of the corresponding intention, in the latter, s/he has to execute the
corresponding routine;
2. how the instruction relates to the goals that the agent may already have, and vice versa,
how such preexisting goals can affect the interpretation of the instruction itself;

3. whether the instructor has total control over the agent's actions and

/

or goals;

4. whether the communicative situation in which an instruction is issued and the performance
situation in which it is executed coincide.

Before describing the different approaches that have been taken so far, I would like to elaborate
on the first two items mentioned above, whether an agent maps instructions onto goals to
perform an action, and whether there is any relation between an instruction and the goals an
agent may already have.
First of all, one should be clear about what action and goal are taken t o mean. One could
say that the goal is a state t o be achieved and the action the act whose performance results in
such a state; or that the goal requires intentionality on the part of the agent, while the action
doesn't. For example Cohen and Levesque in [1990b] define goals as chosen desires; an agent
has a persistent goal if he has a goal that he currently believes t o be false and that he will
continue to choose. Given that instructions describe the world in terms of actions, much more
than in terms of desirable states, I think a reasonable view to take, and in fact one that has been
widely adopted, is that an agent maps an instruction onto a goal, the goal of performing the
action described i n the instruction. However, this point of view is at best adequate for situations
characterized by an obedient agent and by instructions limited to simple positive imperatives.
Consider a command like don't eat the cookies. First of all, the agent niay adopt three different
attitudes toward such a goal:

No commitment. If such an instruction is given t o a passive agent, or t o an agent who is not
interested in eating cookies at all, because e.g. he does not eat anything with sugar at
any rate, the correct final state will be achieved even if the agent's chosen desires, t o use
Cohen and Levesque's terminology, don't include not eating the cookies.
Rejection. The agent can of course reject the proposed goal, and in fact do the opposite.
Commitment. The a.gent does adopt the persistent goal of not eating the cookies.
Let's suppose now the agent does adopt that goal, either because we deal with an obedient
slave, as many computer systems are built t o be, or because, more realistically, the agent is
cooperative - see [Cohen and Levesque, 1990bl for a characterization of a cooperative agent.
Adopting the goal of not eating the cookies can result in (at least) three different kinds of
behavior, none of which in fact can be described as performing the action described i n the
'I will actually limit myself to imperatives: one does find declarative statements in instructions, especially in
instruction manuals, b u t I won't deal with them.
declarative statements appear in t h e introductory part
of the manual, where tools and materials are described, not in the part describing the actual steps of the task a t
hand.

instruction - in fact, one may wonder whether negative instructions describe actions t o be
performed at all:
N o observable action. The agent doesn't do anything that changes the state of the world
with respect to the cookies.
C o n s t r a i n t s o n o t h e r actions. Such a persistent goal may result in constraints on other goals
that the agent may adopt: for example, if the agent were told Go and get me a glass of
water, he could answer I'd rather not, because I would have to go to the kitchen, the cookies
are there, and the temptation would be too strong to resist.
R e l a t e d o b s e r v a b l e action. The agent may think that he cannot yield to the temptation of
eating the cookies, and therefore he may lock them away, and put the key in a place which
is difficult to reach: in this case the agent does perform some actions that help him achieve
the desired goal.
The point I want t o make is that many researchers have concentrated their efforts on positive
commands, which one can indeed consider as describing an action a t o be performed: a cooperative agent will then adopt the goal I' = PERFORM (H, a ) ) . However, as we will see, I' varies
according t o the type of imperative an agent is presented with - a complex positive imperative
including a purpose clause, or a negative one, or a warning. Even when I' is indeed performance
of the described action, as in positive commands, the described action a cannot be taken from the
instruction as it is and just "plugged in" t o obtain something like GOAL(H, PERFORM (H,a)):
a has t o be computed, in ways that I will discuss in this proposal.
That I' is not simply PERFORM (H, a) and that, at any rate, a has to be computed are
two of the main points I want t o address. Before talking about them, though, I will discuss five
different approaches t o instruction understanding in light of the previous comments.
"Simon says" approaches. In the Simon says game, each command issued by the leader
("Simon says put your hands on your ears") is meant t o lead directly and immediately
to behavior on the part of the player. In this case, a command is mapped onto a goal
to perform the action it describes, and no further reasoning on the part of the agent is
necessary, because the described actions are basic, namely, physical actions 2 . There are
no other goals that the agent has, the instructor has total control over the goals that the
agent adopts, and the communicative situation is the performance situation.
In computer systems of this kind, a command corresponds to a stored program: once
the command has been interpreted, the corresponding program is executed. An example
of such systems is the by now venerable SHRLDU [Winograd, 19721. The "Simon says"
approach should not be discarded as the "easy" approach t o instruction understanding,
because the interpretation and execution processes may be quite complicated: for example
in SHRLDU, actions other than those described in the input command may be performed
if they are necessary t o achieve preconditions of the described ones.
T h e s i t u a t e d a p p r o a c h . Chapman in [I9911 proposes a model of instruction interpretation
that is concerned with reacting to the situation at hand, and that heavily relies on perception. The instructor gives instructions or offers suggestions, while watching an agent
2~ee
[Goldman, 19701

and [Pollack, 19861 for a discussion of basic actions.

engaged in an activity - in Chapman's thesis, the activity is playing a video-game. There
is no distinction between the agent's actions and goals, and each action can be adopted as
a goal and executed. However, the agent is not simply an obedient slave and can choose
whether to execute a certain action. Choices are hard-wired in an arbitration network.
Chapman's view of instructions is that they give advice, but also that they are not much
more than perceptual stimuli.
When Sonja [the agent playing the game] is given an instruction, it registers
the entities the instruction refers to and uses the instruction t o choose between
courses of action that themselves make sense in the current situation. An instruction can fail to make sense if it refers t o entities that are not present in
the situation in which it is given, or if the activity it recommends is implausible in its own right. ... As part of taking an instruction you register aspects
of the situation you weren't previously aware of, and project new possibilities.
Based on these new registrations you engage in new activities. ... Instructions
recommend courses of action; Sonja's arbitration network takes account of such
recommendations. ... Because instructions can only influence arbitration when
they make sense in terms of activities Sonja could engage in autonomously, their
role in Sonja is one of management only. [Chapman, 1991, p.761.
An instruction then identifies one action among the ones that belong t o the system repertoire, and gives an additional reason why the agent should choose it. However, that action
will not necessarily be adopted as a goal. The communicative situation and the performance situation coincide as in the "Simon Says" approach, modulo making sense of the
situation, e.g. turn left does not mean turn left immediately, but turn left i n the first place
where you can do so. Chapman's approach seems more concerned with making (immediate) decisions about behavior, than with deriving knowledge from instructions and then
acting.
Vere and Bickmore. Vere and Bickmore in [1990] describe the architecture of a complete
integrated agent. Their agent, a little submarine named Homer, is able t o navigate in a
harbor full of other objects, to go to places, to deliver objects from one place to another.
The submarine can take part in dialogues that include questions, assertions and commands.
A command is a special case of an INFORM event i n which the information transmitted
is that the informer has a goal and wants the informee to achieve it for him. ... There
is a demon in the refEective processes which reacts to general commands by extracting the
goals, processing them, and sending them t o the temporal planner for plan synthesis.

Vere and Bickmore7s view is the usual one, that a command is mapped into a goal to
perform the described action - apart from negative commands, see below. Homer accepts
simple commands from the instructor, who has total control over it, and adopts them as its
own goals: then it reasons about whether it can achieve them. One interesting point is that
there can be time constraints attached to commands, either explicitly - Drop the package
at the barge next Sat. at 9 p.m., or implicitly - If you see a n animal tomorrow, photograph
it: therefore the utterance situation and the performance situation don't coincide.
The system allows for replanning, which is used t o deal with new declarative information which changes the parameters under which a plan had been formulated, and with

additional goals, that may have to be achieved before another goal for which planning
had already taken place. Homer does accept negative commands, which are considered as
global constraints on the activities it can perform. For example, if Homer is told Don't
leave the island today, and later, the same day, Take a picture of the Codfish, it will say it
cannot comply with the latter instruction, because t o do so it would be necessary t o leave
the island.
Although Homer's abilities are quite impressive, it is not clear whether replanning and the
capacity of dealing with negative commands amount to something more than propagating
temporal constraints.
The cooperative agent. Cohen and Levesque in [1990b] adopt the view that the agent adopts

a certain goal as the result of an imperative because he is cooperative.
If an imperative is uttered in circumstances where a hearer does not suspect
(at some level of alternating belief) that the speaker is insincere in his desire t o
get an addressed person to believe that he has a certain goal, then the hearer
will believe (at that level) that the speaker really has that goal. The goal in
question here is that the addressed person should perform something that fulfills
the condition expressed by the imperative sentence (p. 237). ... If addr [the
addressee] does not mind doing the action and is helpfully disposed toward spkr
[the speaker], then we can conclude that addr intends t o do the action relative
to splcr's desire (p.238).
As it is apparent from the quotes above, Cohen and Levesque equate perform something
that fulfills the condition expressed by the imperative sentence with doing the action relative
to spkr's desire, which is actually formalized as a, where a is the content of the imperative.
In light of my observations above on negative imperatives, this is not sufficient. Even
limiting oneself to positive imperatives one may have to compute the described action a.
In a more recent paper [1991], Cohen and Levesque go into some details on how an agent
comes t o intend t o do an action to achieve a goal, and they hint a t an action representation
language, built inductively out of primitive events, and complex expressions created by
action-forming operators for sequential, repetitive, concurrent, disjunctive, and contextual
actions: this seems to me evidence for the fact that they consider event descriptions to be
primitive, namely, that they are not interested in the internal structure of such "primitive"
events; besides, they still don't address at all the issue of computing which actions an
instruction describes.
Cohen and Levesque don't discuss whether the utterance situation and the performance
situation coincide: I imagine they would pay attention to such distinction if they did
examine the performance of the action that fulfills the condition expressed by the imperative
sentence.
In my opinion, the most relevant part of their contribution is the fact that they model the
communicative act taking place between the speaker and the hearer: I will come back to
this and related issues in ch. 5.
Instructions as a way of solving impasses. A different view on instructions is advocated

in [Alterman et al., 19911. The stress is on extending stored knowledge t o new but similar

situations, as for example when knowledge about using a certain device - a home phone
is applied t o the usage of a new, but similar device - a pay phone.

-

An agent has a basic set of skills and plans to solve certain problems. Instructions are
used as a resource only when the stored knowledge about plans cannot be adapted to
the situation a t hand, namely, when the agent is blocked in mapping the goal to action:
instructions come in to specify the appropriate action(s) that will satisfy the goal in that
particular situation. The agent has t o integrate these actions in his knowledge and t o
understand how they relate to the goal he was trying to achieve: this is the only paper I
know which assumes a rich relation between the instructions and the preexisting goal(s).
It is crucial that the communicative situation and the performance situation are the same:
communication comes in t o repair a breakdown in performance. From a certain point
of view, Chapman's approach is not so different, in the sense that for Chapman as well
instructions come in as an additional source of information about the course of action to
follow, when the agent doesn't have enough information t o choose a course of action over
the other.
The following table summarizes the approaches outlined above: the column goal contains
action refers t o whether an instruction is directly mapped into the goal of performing the described action; NA stands for Not Applicable:

Approach

goa1
contains action

relation between
instructions and
other goals

instructor
in control

utterance sit.
necessarily =
performance sit.

"Apart from negative commands.

I think one conclusion that can be drawn from this table is that in general researchers have
not worried about computing the action a to be performed; and that, apart from [Alterman et
al., 19911, not much attention is paid to the mutual interaction between the current instruction
and preexisting goals. The approach I am going t o propose instead relies in an active way on
such mutual interaction, and tries to make the agent's knowledge flexible enough so that the
same instruction uttered in the context of different goals will result in different behavior.
The scenario I have in mind is as follows: the speaker - to whom I will refer by means
of "S", and feminine pronouns - gives instructions t o the hearer - "H", referred to by means
of masculine pronouns. S formulates her instructions by taking into account what S thinks H
knows and can do. Of course, S doesn't exactly know what H knows, and moreover, in certain
applications, S issues commands related to S's, not H7s, knowledge of the current situation.
However, S can rely on some basic skills and abilities that S knows H has, and on the fact that
H is not a cognitively passive slave that can accept only instructions that exactly mirror his

knowledge, but can accommodate instructions with respect to his general knowledge, and his
knowledge of the situation.
That H can take, and in fact has to take, an active part in the interpretation and execution
of instructions has been shown in work done in various areas, among which anthropology and
plan recognition.
As an example of observations made in an anthropological setting, consider [Suchman, 19871;
she says that instructions are irremediably incomplete, and that the problem of the instructionfollower is viewed as one of turning essentially partial descriptions of objects and actions into
concrete practical activities with predictable outcome. ... instructions rely upon the recipient's
ability to do the implicit work of anchoring descriptions to concrete objects and actions.
Some plan recognition work, in particular [Pollack, 19861, is also concerned with the fact that

H has to be active in the execution of instructions. One of her examples is
S: "I want to talk to Kathy. Do you know the phone number at the hospital?
H: "She's already been discharged. Her home number is xxxxxx"

3"

This dialogue fragment shows flexibility on H's part: he addresses S's goal of talking to Kathy,
not so much her direct question, and answers cooperatively.
The kind of flexibility that I want to account for is more limited, in a sense, than what
Martha Pollack wants to account for: I'll discuss the differences with Pollack's approach in
sect. 2.1.3. My view is that the hearer's task is one of understanding the role that an input
instruction plays in a global plan to do something, but also t o adapt his own knowledge of that
plan to the instruction he has to understand. I would contend that, in the vast majority of cases,
instructions assume a certain basic set of skills and abilities of the agent and just specify how
they are to be related t o one another. I think this is consistent with what Chapman says, that
routine activity is by far the more common. W e spend most of our lives engaged i n activities
like making breakfast, driving to work, reading the paper, ...; these rarely involve novel elements.
Even creative work is mainly routine: it's rewording sentences or painting the background of
the scene .... While he was mainly concerned with how much you can do with just these basic
skills, I am more concerned with how you can understand instructions by assuming these basic
building blocks and relating them in the way the instructions suggest.
To illustrate what I mean with relating basic blocks to each other, let's consider the following
example 4 :

Ex. 2 Go into the other room t o get the urn of coffee.
It is clear that H doesn't have a particular plan that deals with getting a n urn of cofSee. He
will have a generic plan about get z, which he will adapt to the instructions S gives him 5 . Some
of this adaptation task is quite easy, namely, parameter instantiation, in this case binding the
patient parameter of get t o an individual satisfying the description urn of coffee. But the rest
is not so direct: H has to find the connection between go into the other room and get the urn of
3That S formulates his request as a question is not important: give me the phone number at the hospital would
be equivalent, albeit less polite.
4From the animation script used in the AnimNL project [Webber et al., 19911 - see ch. 5.
5 ~ c t u a l l yH may have more than one single plan for get x, in which case go into the other room may in fact
help to select the plan the instructor has in mind - I will address this issue later.

coflee. This connection requires reasoning about the effects of go with respect t o the plan get
x; notice that the (most direct) connection between these two actions requires the assumption
that the referent of the urn of coffee is in the other room.

A possible strategy is as follows. The agent's plan for get will contain a requirement that
the agent move to the place where the object t o be "gotten" is located: from this the agent
can derive that the (most direct) connection between these two actions is that go into the other
room fulfills this requirement, under the assumption that the referent of the u r n of coffee is in
the other room.
This process of adaptation of H's plan to S's instructions, I would claim, is what normally
happens when people interpret instructions. I will call this process accommodation, borrowing
the term from [Lewis, 19791, and using it in a related but slightly different way, as I will show
in the next two sections.

2.1.1

Lewis on accomn~odation

Lewis in [I9791 uses the term accommodation t o refer to the process by which conversational
score does tend to evolve i n such a way as is required i n order to make whatever occurs count as
correct play. By conversational score, Lewis means the state of the conversation, described by
various components, such as sets of presuppositions.
Lewis uses the concept of accommodation to deal with different linguistic phenomena, among
which
Presuppositions. If I say All of Frederick's children are asleep, and there has been no mention
of Fred's children so far, the presupposition that Fred has children is readily added t o the
set of current presuppositions.
Definite descriptions. I will actually describe the way that Heim in [I9821 exploits accommodation to deal with novel definites, because her treatment is more perspicuous.

In the file-change semantics Heim develops for NPs, the usage of a definite NP is felicitous
only if there is already an appropriate card in the file describing the referent of that
NP. However, there are some usages of definite NPs that do not fit with this condition,
for example the inferrable usage ("the author" in "John read a book about Schubert,
and wants to write to the author"). Heim rewrites her Novelty-Familiarity-Condition by
postulating accommodation as an adjustment of the file that is triggered by a violation of
a felicity condition and consists of adding to the file enough information to remedy the
infelicity.
She also adds that Under which conditions is accommodation an available option, and what
exactly is added to the file when the option is taken? these questions are by no means easy
to answer ...
Planning. Lewis's accommodation is usually mentioned in regard t o referring expressions, but
he also talks about planning, albeit briefly. He says (notice that the utterance that has
to be accommodated is uttered while discussing a plan t o steal plutonium from a nuclear
plant):

Much as some things said in ordinary conversation require suitable presuppositions, so some things that we say in the course of planning require, for their
acceptability, that the plan contains some suitable provisions. If I say "Then
you drive the getaway car up to the side gate", that is acceptable only if the
plan includes provision for a getaway car. That might or might not have been
part of the plan already. If not, it may become part of the plan just because it
is required by what I said.
As far as planning is concerned, therefore, Lewis's accommodation refers t o a global process,
very similar to the one occurring for presuppositions, of making room for (relatively) new things
in the plan if they are not already there. I am talking about a similar form of accommodation,
that allows an agent to understand instructions that don't exactly mirror his knowledge. As I
will show in the next section, I think the fundamental concept that comes t o play during the
accommodation of a is the purpose to achieve which a has t o be performed.
Before I proceed in the discussion, I need to draw some distinctions.
1. So far, I have been talking about accommodating instructions: clearly, what is accommodated is the content of an instruction. For example, if we map a positive command
onto something like GOAL (H, PERFORM (a)), then what needs t o be accommodated is
actually the internal argument a.
2. In the next section, I will start talking about the purpose of an action, and for lack of a
better terminology, I'll use the term goal in that case too. The notion of goal will then
correspond to a three-place predicate, stating that the agent has the goal of performing a
in order t o perform /?:

For the moment, I'll use the term goal t o refer t o both definitions of the predicate GOAL:
the reader should keep the distinction in mind.

2.1.2

T h e i~otioilof g o a l as guide t o accolnmodation

Two questions that Lewis does not address are: why does H accept a certain instruction, and
accommodate it in his plan to do something? Does accommodation happen because there is
something else that supports and justifies it?
My claim is that the answer t o the latter question is yes, and that the basic notion here
is that of goal. In Lewis's example above, the accomnlodation necessary to account for the
getaway car is readily performed because there is a global goal for the plan in question, which
is steal plutonium from a nuclear plant; and a subgoal of this plan is escape safely. It's not
blind accommodation, then: it happens because there is something that justifies it. Notice that
mentioning the function of the car, getaway, is crucial to the accommodation process: if the
instruction t o be accommodated had been Then you drive the car up to the side gate, it would
have been much harder to find its place in the global plan, if no car had been mentioned so far.

his definition should not be taken too literally: I am just trying to keep the two different notions of goal
distinct. I will come back to formalizing them in later chapters.

In general, instructions cannot be interpreted without taking into account the context in
which they are issued. This is of course true of other NL phenomena as well, such as referential
expressions. However, in the case of instructions particular kinds of context have t o be taken
into account, namely, the speaker's beliefs, as Martha Pollack has shown [Pollack, 19861; and
the one I am most interested in, the goal in the context of which that particular instruction has
t o be interpreted and executed.
To prove my point, consider a simple instruction such as:
Ex. 3 Open the door.

The execution of this action will vary according to whether the goal of opening the door is letting
the cat in or out - a small opening is sufficient; letting a guest in or out - the door has t o be
open wider than for the cat; letting in or out movers that carry bulky furniture - the door is
best propped open.
In general, there is not a single goal according to which an instruction has to be interpreted
and executed, but a set of them. Consider this instruction step in making a stuffed toy:
Ex. 4 To attach arms, use doubled white carpet thread and push needle i n one side of the body
and out the other side at points indicated by dots on the pattern.

The action push needle i n one side of the body ... has to be performed t o attach arms. In
turn, the action attach arms has to be performed in the context of making a doll: this puts some
requirements on attaching arms, e.g. where the arms have to be attached. These requirements
"filter down" t o the interpretation and execution of push needle i n one side of the body etc.
Notice that the modifier at points indicated by dots i n the pattern is not sufficient t o establish
where t o attach the arms. In fact, the pattern contains many dots, corresponding t o where arms,
legs, head should be attached: therefore, the goal to attach arms does affect the interpretation
of the prepositional phrases i n one side of the body and out the other side.
I would now like t o conclude this section by fending off some possible criticisms.
1. The function of goals is only that of giving the agent the reason why he should
perforin a certain action. This is a common view, but naturally occurring purpose
clauses show that there is something else going on. I already discussed the following
example in ch. 1:
Ex. 5

a) Place a plank between two ladders.
b) Place a plank between two ladders to create a simple scaflold.

In both a) and b), the action to be executed is '$lace a plank between two ladders".
However, Ex. 5.b would be correctly interpreted by placing the plank anywhere between
the two ladders: this shows that in a) the agent must be inferring the proper position
for the plank from the expressed goal "to create a simple scaffold". Therefore, to create a
simple scaffold isn't simply used to tell H why he should place a plank between two ladders,
but also t o help him execute the action correctly.
2. Goals are significant only at execution time. Someone may object that, while the
concept of goal is definitely relevant, it has t o be taken into account only at the moment

of executing an action. This is the view embodied in [Alterman et al., 19911. While this
is true for Ex. 3 above, there are two reasons why one would think that goals affect the
interpretation of instructions too. First of all, it is very often NL itself that conveys, more
or less implicitly, the goal in the context of which an instruction should be interpreted, as in
Exs. 5.a and 6. Therefore a NL system that interprets actions has to be able t o recognize
and actively use goals as they arise from NL specifications of actions, to compute the
descriptions of the actions t o be executed.
Secondly, an agent may perform inferences that make the actions he has t o execute executable without being already engaged in the corresponding activity. An example will
make my claim clearer:

Ex. 6 Cut the square i n half to create two triangles.
This example contains the explicit goal to create two triangles. The action described in
the matrix sentence, cut the square i n half, is underspecified in that there are an infinite
number of ways of cutting a square in half, including along an axis and along a diagonal. An
agent with basic knowledge about the world, though, won't have any difficulty in executing
this instruction in the correct way, namely, cutting the square along the diagonal, because
the goal to create two triangles unambiguously specifies how the cutting action should be
performed. What I want t o point out here is that I am not claiming that the computation
of the action t o be executed necessarily happens a t interpretation time; what I do want t o
stress though is that, given his basic abilities, the agent can understand what is required
simply from the NL instruction. These are the kind of inferences I'd like t o account for;
and this is the sense in which I am saying that the goal affects not just execution, but also
interpretation of instructions.

2.1.3

Differences w i t h o t h e r approaches

I would now like t o answer two very likely questions about my work: how is accommodation
different from plan recognition 7? and how is it different from the approach to instructions
advocated in [Alterman et al., 1991]?
1. Is a c c o i n i ~ l o d a t i o ndifferent froill plan recognition?
Accommodation can be seen as a subtype of plan recognition, but only if plan recognition
is defined is terms as general as those used by I<autz in [1990]: One is given a fragmented,
impoverished description of tlze actions performed by one or more agents, and expected
to infer a rich, higlzly interrelated description. The new description fills out details of
the setting, and relates the actions of the agents i n the scenario to their goals and future
actions. The result of the plan recognition process can be used t o generate summaries
of the situation, to help (or hinder) the agentls), and t o build up a context for use in
disambiguating further observations.

Accommodation, as plan recognition, can be considered as a process of inferring a rich,
highly interrelated description, even if accommodation deals with descriptions of future
'I am here talking about accommodation processes relative to understanding instructions, not about the
accommodation in general, e.g. with respect to accommodating presuppositions.

behavior, plan recognition with descriptions of observed events. However, the term plan
recognition is generally used to refer to the set of inferences that various researchers working
in the area have investigated. Accommodation is indeed different from those particular
implementations of plan recognition: t o explain the difference, I will first illustrate the
inferences I think are part of accommodation, and then the inferences investigated by two
of the most important researchers in the area of plan recognition, Kautz and Pollack.
Accommodation. The inferences that I have identified so far as being part of accommodation can be typified by Exs. 6 - Cut the square in half to create two triangles and
2 - G o into the other room to get the urn of cojfee.
In the first kind of accommodation - Ex. 6 - we have to find a more specific action
r r l which will achieve the goal specified by the purpose clause, as shown in Fig. 2.1.

p

(create two triangles)

p (create

two triangles)

(cut the square in half
along the diagonal)
Figure 2.1: Schematic depiction of the first kind of accommodation
In Ex. 6, we have ,O = create two triangles, rr = cut the square i n half, a1 = cut the
square i n half along the diagonal.
In the second case, it is necessary t o find the conditions under which the current
instruction makes sense: here, that the urn is in the other room, or at least, that the
other room contains some indications as how to get the urn. These conditions can
be worked out by relating the effects of go t o what the performance of get requires.
Lewis's getaway car example is similar, although more complex, as the getaway car
has t o be related t o the content of the plan for stealing plutonium. Schematically, one
could represent this kind of inference as in Fig. 2.2 - P is the goal, a the instruction t o

accommodate, Ak7sthe actions belonging to the plan to achieve ,l3, C for the necessary
assumptions. Ex. 2 would result in the configuration shown in Fig. 2.3.
In this case the only object that needs t o be accommodated is a. However, it may
happen that also the goal ,l3 needs t o be accommodated with respect t o the structure
of the intentions that H has built so far. In general there may be structures of
action descriptions that need t o be accommodated, such as those deriving from the
interpretation of purpose clauses. However, I will try t o keep the process hierarchical,
namely, first accommodate the goal ,l3, then the action a. After all, the goal ,l3 has
more importance: the agent first has t o commit to it, and only after that he will
commit to a way of achieving it.
It may happen that the two kinds of inference need t o be combined, although no
example I have found so far seems t o require it. In this case, we would need to find
the conditions under which an instruction a makes sense in the context of a certain
goal, and we may then discover that the relevant action is not a, but a more specific
al, as in Fig. 2.4.
In the latter case, it may also be necessary to check whether a1 remains compatible
with the higher goal(s).

Kautz. I<autz uses an is-a hierarchy and a part-of hierarchy to infer what plans a certain
event can be part of; he then uses the goals he discovers to constrain the search for the
plan of which the next event is part-of. Suppose he starts with an event description
6 ; he may then deduce that 6 can be part of the plans to achieve G1 or G2. A second
event description w is in turn part of plans to achieve GI or G3. Finally, by merging
the two subgraphs, Kautz obtains a description of what plans both E and w may be
part of - see Fig. 2.5.
The difference between accommodation and I<autz7sinferences is that accommodation
doesn't assume an exact description of the action t o be performed, and in fact uses
a known goal to compute the more refined actions needed t o satisfy the goal. I<autz
goes the other way, as he exploits known and complete descriptions of events to infer
higher and unknown goals.

Pollack. Pollack in [I9861 is concerned with finding the relation between a known goal
G and a known action a, relation that for her is embodied in an explanatory plan,
or E-plan. She finds the proper E-plan relating G and a by searching in parallel for
E-plans of which a is part, and for E-plans which achieve G. The important point is
that certain conditions have t o hold for an E-plan to achieve G. If these conditions
don't hold, then the algorithm will search for another E-plan, possibly independent
from a , that can achieve G, and will suggest it t o the user - see Fig. 2.6.
Therefore, both accommodation and Pollack's inference processes heavily rely on
already knowing the goal. However, if a doesn't achieve the goal, my approach is
to compute constraints on it, so that cr can be understood as a l , that does achieve
G; instead, Pollack finds another E-plan that does achieve G, where a and the new
E-plan are not necessarily related.
Given that Pollack determines whether an E-plan does achieve G by means of conditions that have t o hold for the relation t o go through, she needs to know these
conditions a priori t o be able t o evaluate them in the current situation. In recent
work, Lochbaum [1991b] uses a similar representation, and makes it more flexible
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Figure 2.2: Schematic depiction of the second kind of accommodation

Get the urn of coffee

Get (H, urn-of-coffee)

accommodation
Go into the other room

C = In(urn-of-coffee,other-room))
Go(H, into(other-room))
Figure 2.3: Example of the second kind of accommodation

A

?

accommodation

Figure 2.4: The two kinds of accommodation combined

by computing the possible variable bindings under which such conditions may hold,
while Pollack has these conditions automatically grounded and simply verifies whether
they hold; however, also Lochbaum needs to state all necessary conditions in advance.
However, there are other conditions, like the assumption urn in the other room, that
may be necessary in order for this relation to go through, and with which I am
concerned, while they are not.
The distinctions between the inferences I want to account for and the ones accounted for
by Kautz and Pollack are important, but in addition there is an underlying assumption
that makes accommodation very different from the work done so far under the label plan
recognition. The point of view that the actions described in the input have t o be considered
as linguistic objects is at the basis of my efforts. I treat the contents of instructions as
descriptions, and most likely, incomplete ones. I am interested in explaining how the real
action descriptions that people use and understand can be accounted for. The need of
treating actions as linguistic objects is not addressed at all in plan recognition work s.
2. Is accoininodation different froin t h e a p p r o a c h i n [ A l t e r i n a n et al., 1991]?
The two may be seen as similar, because both advocate adapting H's plan to the instructions. However, I take the view that instructions are continually integrated into
the general plan that the agent is building, not only when the execution of an acquired
procedure breaks down.
'Others have looked at plan recognition in a linguistic setting (e.g. [Lambert and Carberry, 19911, [Litman
and Allen, 1990]), but their linguistic considerations concern recognizing which speech-acts a certain utterance is
an expression of, not what actions it describes.

Figure 2.5: Kautz's inferences

if CI does not hold

a

a
Figure 2.6: Pollack's inferences

To show that instructions are not only used in the way Alterman et al. suggest, consider
following directions to reach a certain place in town. This is a typical case in which known
actions, such as go straight until ..., turn left at ..., cross over ..., are related in a way that
teaches the agent something new. However, this does not imply that all that the agent is
doing is mapping reference points in the directions onto their referents in the environment
and then executing the command. Directions, as all other instructional text, may involve
complex imperatives, such as purpose clauses - to get into the building, turn left at the
first intersection and ring the bell at the second door on your right; negative commands turn left, but don't take the first left because it is a blind alley; warnings - Take the first
left, but be careful if you're driving because it is very steep.
One can't invoke a learned procedure for getting to a certain place if one doesn't know how
to get there. Of course following directions may involve breakdowns of the kind [Alterman
et al., 19911 describes. If the agent gets lost, he will do something to repair his plan, such
as consulting a map or asking a passer-by for further directions. In the latter case, the
agent will be given a new set of instructions, that he will have to integrate into the known
plan, in a way presumably very similar to the process described in [Alterman et al., 19911.
However, the general process of following directions seems t o me much more similar t o the
one Chapman discusses, namely, putting together some basic building blocks in a novel
way.
A problem that [Alterman et al., 19911 accounts for, which I don't, is learning. Following
directions t o get t o a certain place will teach the agent something new, namely, how to get
there. One could say that in general it is following instructions, rather than interpreting

them, that teaches the agent something new; this newly acquired knowledge may then be
subsequently used as needed. For the moment, I won't address the issue of learning.

2.2

Thesis statement and proposed work

My claim is then that

most instructions don't exactly mirror H7s knowledge, but are understood by accommodating them
i n the context of the general plan H is considering; H7s accommodation process is guided by the
goal(s) that H is trying to achieve. The concept of goal itseEf is pervasive i n NL instructions, and
a NL system which interprets instructions must be able to recognize and/or hypothesize goals,
keep track of them, and use them in computing the description of the action to be performed.
To show that my claim is justified:
1. I will illustrate my views on H's inference processes by means of two different syntactic
constructions, purpose clauses and negative imperatives. I will show what pragmatic
functions they perform, and which kinds of inferences H has t o do to understand
them.
2. I will show how H's inferences are directed by the notion of goal. This is equally true
when H interprets purpose clauses, that express goals explicitly; or negative imperatives, whose correct interpretation is often constrained by the goal in the context of
which an action should not be performed.

To show that my claim is valid:
1. granted the importance of goals, I will show that, to perform accommodation, H uses

(a) heuristics derived from the pragmatic usage of certain constructs in instructions;
(b) knowledge about actions;
(c) knowledge about relations between actions.
2. I will then discuss the consequences of such views for a computational model of
instructions. I will propose to develop a model composed of

(a) A speaker / hearer model of complex imperatives based on the one developed in
[Cohen and Levesque, 1990bl.
(b) A representation of actions, and of goals, that provides support for performing
the inferences I will discuss. I will propose that a hybrid system, Q la KRYPTON
[Brachman et al., 1983al should be used. The primitives in the system should be
the same that Ray Jackendoff proposes in [I9901 for the semantic representation
of verbs and actions. Jackendoff's representation will then provide semantic
theoretical foundations, while the hybrid system will provide an organization for
the lexicon.
(c) Inference mechanisms that contribute to building the structure of the intentions
- the plan gmph - that H develops while interpreting S's instructions; the representation of such plan graph will also be discussed.

And finally, a comment and a disclaimer
In the statement of my claim above, I used the word mirror. It is obvious that instructions
don't exactly mirror H's knowledge: if they did, there would be no point in giving instructions in
the first place! As I already pointed out, the new information that instructions provide mainly
resides in the way that actions known t o H are linked together to form a previously unknown
plan t o achieve a certain goal. However, the way that known actions are described in instructions
cannot be expected to exactly correspond t o the knowledge that H has of those actions: this is
a point t h a t has often been overlooked in many systems that deal with instructions, in which
a representation such as cut.square.in-half.along-diagonalis supposed to capture all the infinite
ways in which such a n action could be described in an instruction. This is the inexact match
between input instructions and H's knowledge I am referring to.
As far as regards the disclaimer: the instructions I am dealing with are in Natural Language.
Understanding them requires the numerous inference processes that Natural Language processing involves, such as pronominal reference, or telling apart distributive and collective readings
of plural predicates, just to name two of them. Clearly I am not going t o solve the general
problem of understanding language: all I want t o show is t h a t , in dealing with instructions,
first, the concept of goal is necessary; and second, that there are specific inference processes
that help make sense of instructions, exploiting, among other things, heuristics derived from
particular syntactic structures. I will assume that I can abstract away from issues such as
parsing, pronominal and definite reference, the treatment of plurals: such assumptions are even
more reasonable because my work is grounded in the project Animation from Natural Language
instructions [Badler et al., 1990; JVebber et al., 19911, where modules devoted t o parsing and t o
representing and updating the discourse model do exist. I will discuss the project in sect. 5.5.

Chapter 3

Purpose clauses
In the previous chapter, I emphasized the role that goals play in the accommodation process,
where accommodation is a general name for many of the inferences that an agent performs upon
being given NL instructions. I also claimed that such inferences are exemplified in a particularly
clear way when the goal is explicitly expressed, as in the case of purpose clauses.
In fact, it is purpose clauses that motivated my interest in the kind of inferences I am trying
t o characterize. In this chapter, I will illustrate how accommodation processes come into play
in the processing of purpose clauses.
In the following, after a brief explanation of what I mean by the term purpose clauses, I will
discuss:
1. what entities the matrix clause and its adjoined purpose clause describe;
2. what functions purpose clauses perform;
3. what kinds of relations between actions purpose clauses embody.

I will conclude with some brief remarks about the consequences of such analysis on a computational model of instructions, including a speaker / hearer model, action representation, and
inference processes. I will go into the relative technical proposals in ch. 5.
My observations are based on one hundred and one consecutive instances of naturally occurring purpose clauses, which I collected from a how-to-do book on installing wall coverings, and
from two craft magazines

3.1

Purpose clauses and action descriptions

At a very general level, purpose clauses can be characterized as follows:
1. S uses them t o explain t o H the g o d P t o whose achievement the execution of a contributes.
-

-

~ T be
O precise, 26 pages of the book provided 51 examples; all the remaining 50 examples come from the
"project sections" of the magazines.

2. They generally relate action descriptions a t different levels of abstraction, such as a physical
action and an abstract process, as in Ex. 8 below, or two physical actions, but a t different
levels of granularity, as in
Ex. 7 Bend your knees to lift a very heavy object.

3. As I already observed in the previous chapter, not only does the goal ,B explain t o H why
he should do a, it also constrains the interpretation of a - see Exs. 5 and 6. Therefore,
from S's point of view, we can look at purpose clauses as constraints on the action to be
executed; accordingly, H will have to compute the action t o execute.
Before going into a more detailed analysis of purpose clauses, I'd like to make some brief
remarks on my use of terminology. I am using the term purpose clauses t o refer t o clauses that
express the agent's purpose in performing a certain action. I have concentrated on infinitival
to constructions, but other clauses, such as those introduced by so that, such that may also
perform the same function. Therefore, I am not using the term purpose clause in the technical
way it has been used in syntax; there, it refers to a particular type of infinitival to clauses, which
are adjoined t o NPs. In contrast, the infinitival clauses I have concentrated on are adjoined t o
a matrix clause, and are termed rational clauses in syntax; in fact all the data I will discuss
in this chapter belong t o a particular subclass of such clauses, subject-gap rational clauses.
For a syntactic account of rational and purpose clauses and their differences, see [Jones, 19851,
[Hegarty, 19901.
In the following, I will discuss the following dimensions of analysis:
1. what is described by the matrix and the purpose clauses

-

namely, actions or states;

2. what kinds of goals are expressed by a purpose clause;
3. what kinds of relations between actions are expressed by purpose clauses.

3.2

Only action descriptions in purpose clauses?

So far, I have been implying that both matrix and purpose clause describe an action, a and ,b'
respectively:

Ex. 8 To inix light colors, place white in the dish first and add color slowly until desired
color is reached.
However, there are rare cases in which one of the two clauses describes a state a, while the
other clause describes an action. I actually found only one such case, in which the matrix clause
describes the state a :

Ex. 9 To be successfully covered, a wood wall m u s t be flat a n d s m o o t h .
I haven't found any instances in which both matrix and purpose clause describe a state. Intuitively, this makes sense because what the speaker wants to express here is the purpose why a
certain action should be performed; even in the syntactic literature this function is recognized,

e.g. [Hegarty, 19901 says that rational clauses denote a rationale o n the part of the agent to
carry out the action described i n the matriz clause 2 .

3.3

Which kinds of goals?

I have been saying that a purpose clause expresses a goal to which the action described in the
main clause contributes. As I said, the goal ,8 gives a more abstract description of the action a
that the main clause describes, or gives a more general context for the execution of a. In most
cases, the goal ,8 describes a change in the world. However, in some cases
1. The change is not in the world, but in H7sknowledge. By executing a, H can change the
state of his knowledge with respect to a certain proposition or t o the value of a certain
entity.

Ex. 1 0 To d e t e r m i n e if a c u r v e is t o o s m a l l f o r t h e blade, use this rule of thumb:
the smallest circle you can accurately cut will have a radius twice the width of the blade
you 're using.
Ex. 11 You may want to hang a coordinating border around the room at the top of the
walls. To d e t e r m i n e t h e a m o u n t of b o r d e r , measure the width (in feet) of all walls
to be covered and divide by three. Since borders are sold by the yard, this will give you the
number of yards needed.
Many of such examples involve verbs such as check, make sure etc. followed by a thatcomplement describing a state
The usage of such verbs has the pragmatic effect that
not only does H check whether q5 holds, but, if doesn't hold, s/he will also do something
so that d comes t o hold.

+.

+

Ex. 1 2 To attach the wires to the new switch, use the paper clip to move the springtype
clip aside and slip the wire into place. Tug gently o n each wire t o m a k e s u r e it's secure.
2. The purpose clause may inform H that the world should not change, namely, that a given
event should be prevented from happening:

Ex. 13 Tape raw edges of fabric t o p r e v e n t t h r e a d s f r o m raveling as y o u work.
Ex. 14 To p r e v e n t weeds f r o m g e t t i n g a foothold i n t h e g a r d e n , mulch your
seedlings when they are several inches high. Use a thick layer of straw, shredded bask,
ground corn cobs, cocoa bean hulls, leaves, or newspaper. The mulch will smother weeds
and increase soil moisture.
From a discourse processing point of view, interpreting a purpose clause may affect the discourse
model, in particular by introducing new referents. This happens when the effect of a is to create
a new object, and p identifies it. Verbs frequently used in this context are create, make, form
etc.
2 ~ h e r eare clearly other ways of describing that a state is the goal of a certain action, for example by means
of so/such that, but I won't deal with such data.

Ex. 15 Join the short ends of the hat band t o form a circle.
Similarly, in Ex. 6 the discourse referents for the triangles created by cutting the square in
half, and in Ex. 11 the referent for amount of border are introduced. Ex. 11 shows that the
function of introducing a new referent, and the previous functions I mentioned, are not mutually
exclusive.

3.4

Which relations between act ions?

So far, I have talked about a contributing to achieve the goal P. The notion of contribution can
be made more specific by examining naturally occurring purpose clauses. In the majority of
cases, they express generation, and in the rest enablement. In the following, I will define both
relations, I will provide examples of both, and finally I will talk about the fact that there is no
clear cut distinction between the two.

3.4.1

Generation

Generation is a relation between actions that has been extensively studied in the literature, first
in philosophy [Goldman, 19701 and then in planning [Allen, 19841, [Pollack, 19861, [Balkanski,
19901, [Lochbaum, 1991al.
Informally, if action a generates action P , we can say that P is executed by executing a. Examples are (from [Goldman, 19701):

The agent G turns o n the light by flipping the switch, or
G checkmates his opponent by moving his queen to king-knight-seven.
Without going into too many details, we can say that an action a generates another action ,f3
iff:
1. a and ,8 are simultaneous;
2. a is not part of doing O, (as in the case of playing a C note as part of playing a C triad on
a piano);

3. when a occurs, a set of conditions C hold, such that the joint occurrence of a and C imply
the occurrence of p. For example in the turning o n the Eight example, C may include that
the wire, the switch and the bulb are working.
Although there is no generation relation between a and P if a is part of a sequence of actions
A to do p, there maybe a generation relation between A and P, if the conditions above hold on
A and p .
Generation is a pervasive relation between action descriptions in naturally occurring data.
There are cases in which it is expressed by the preposition by, as in:

Ex. 16 Remove excess paste by wiping gently or blotting with a damp sponge.
It can also be expressed with a simple free adjunct, as in:

Ex. 17 A s you work, clean the surface thoroughly each time you change grits, vacuuming off
all the dust and wiping the wood with a rag dampened with turpentine or paint
thinner.
However, by clauses are not as common as purpose clauses: I found only 27 of them in the
same corpus. Similarly, adjuncts are not often used to express generation: only 10 out of 97
adjuncts found in a corpus that includes the one used for purpose clauses express generation
[Webber and Di Eugenio, 19901. It looks like generation in instructional text is mainly expressed
by means of purpose clauses. They may express either a direct generation relation between cr
and p , or an indirect generation relation between a and ,O, where by indirect generation I mean
that a belongs to a sequence of actions A which generates P.
As an example of direct generation, consider Ex. 6, repeated here for convenience:

Ex. 18 Cut the square i n half t o create two triangles
In this case, the only action that needs t o be done to create two triangles is cutting the square
i n half [along the diagonal].
As an example of indirect generation, consider Ex. 8, or

Ex. 19 To cut parts F measure 1-3/4" from the top and mark. Measure from that point
7-1/2n to the left and mark. kfeasure up from the bottom 1-3/4" and mark. Draw a line from
the first mark to the third mark to create the slant for the sides. Cut along this edge.
The whole paragraph is an explanation of how to cut parts F. It is the whole sequence of
actions described in the paragraph that achieves this result. Therefore, the relation between to
cut parts F and measure 1-3/dn from the top and mark is one that I call of indirect generation:
the latter action description is part of a sequence of actions that generates the former. Notice
that the paragraph above contains another purpose clause, to create the slant for the sides,
which individuates a subgoal in the context of cutting parts F.

Following first Pollack [I9863 and then Ballcanski [1990], enablement can be defined as holding
between two actions a and ,B if and only if an occurrence of a brings about a set of conditions
that are necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) for the subsequent performance of P.
An example is buying ingredients enables preparing the dish (from [Balkanski, 19901). In this
case, buying ingredients brings about a condition that is necessary for the dish preparation
action to be executable.
There are not many purpose clauses that express an enablement relation between ar and
In fact, there is only one example that truly seems to express enablement:

P.

Ex. 20 Unscrew tlze p~otectiveplate t o expose the box.
Unscrew the protective plate enables taking the plate ofS which generates exposing the box.
Another case that at first sight could be classified as expressing enablement, but that actually
doesn't exactly correspond to the notion of enablement is:
Parts F refers to a diagram.

Ex. 2 1 Build this simple but elegant corner s h e l f t o display all the other decorative pieces
found in this issue.
Having the shelf is not a necessary condition for displaying the decorative pieces. In fact, it's
not even the case that H has to adopt the intention of displaying such pieces; probably such an
example should be classified as facilitation - see [Balkanski, 19901.

3.4.3

Generation and enablement in modeling actions

That purpose clauses express generation and enablement is a welcome finding, given that these
two relations have been proposed by several researchers - [Allen, 19841, [Pollack, 19861 - as
necessary t o model actions.
Pollack in her thesis [I9861 is particularly vocal in advocating these two relations as the basis
for action representation. Her motivations stem from the need for a perspicuous representation
for an agent's plans, representation that can support her view of plans as mental phenomenon.
She notices that in the plan inference literature plans are generally derived by composing basic
planning operators, which are represented as follows:
Header: P
Preconditions :
Body : a

P

She criticizes such a representation because the relation between a and /3 is not precisely defined:
researchers have assumed any of causes, is-a-precondition-of, is-a-way-to. She then prefers t o
use a representation based on generation and enablement, which she can precisely define.

I would like t o add two further motivations for using generation and enablement. One is
the presence of such relations in Natural Language instructions. The other is that using such
relations t o model actions allows us to draw conclusions about action execution as well-a particularly useful consequence given that my work is taking place in the framework of the Animation
from Natural Language project [Badler et al., 1990; Levison, 1991; Webber et al., 19911 in which
the input instructions do have t o be executed, namely, animated.
Knowing that two actions are related by generation allows us t o draw the conclusion that,
while two actions are described, only a , the generator, needs to be performed. For example,
in Ex. 18, there is no creating action per se that has t o be executed: the physical action to
be performed is cutting. As already pointed out in the previous chapter, the fact that only
the generator a has to be executed does not mean that qualifications t o the description of the
generatee ,i3 should be disregarded: in fact we know that the goal P constrains the interpretation
and / or execution of a . Consider Ex. 17: the instruction to the agent is that s/he has to vacuum
and wipe every time s/he changes grits, which is a qualification to the description of cleaning.
In contrast t o generation, if a enables P, the agent knows that, after executing a , P still
needs t o be executed. In fact, if a enables P, a has t o temporally precede P, where temporal
precedence should be understood as a beginning, but not necessarily ending, before P: in Ex. 22,
hold has t o continue for the whole duration of the fill.

Ex. 22 Hold the cup under the spigot t o fill it with cogee.

In addition, in the same way that the generatee affects the execution of the generator, so the
enabled action affects the execution of the enabling action. Consider, for instance, the difference
in the interpretation of to in go to the mirror, depending upon whether the action t o be enabled
is seeing oneselj or carrying the mirror somewhere else.
Having established that these two relations are useful to model Natural Language descriptions
of actions, the problem is t o formalize them adequately.
One issue that has t o be addressed is the fact that the distinction between generation and
enablement becomes blurred when we extend the concept of generation t o a sequence of actions
A < a l , a z , ...,a, > that generate another action p *. What is then the relation between a; and
p ? I will suggest that if < a l , a z , ...,a, > generates P, enablement may relate any pair a; and
a k , while the relation between a; and /3 can be termed indirect generation. Actually, at least
for i = 1, the relation between a; and /3 could be equivalently seen as enablement.
I will go back t o the difference between generation and enablement in chapter 5.

3.5

Consequences for a computational model of instructions

I see three kinds of consequences that purpose clauses have on computational models of instructions.
First of all, they require that existing computational models of intentions, such as Cohen
and Levesque's, be augmented t o take into account the particular interpretation process that
an imperative containing a purpose clause requires of the hearer - in particular, that Do cu to
do ,G' is used t o tell H that s/he should adopt the intention t o do /3; and that a contributes t o
the execution of p. It seems that the goal ,O has more importance than a : namely, we should
account for the fact that a (cooperative) hearer has to commit t o p, but could choose another
a t o achieve p. That the goal ,O has more importance than a is shown also when the purpose
clause is adjoined t o a negative matrix clause, as in Don't use chemicals to clean your parquet
floor. Needless to say, the hearer has to adopt the intention of doing P, cleaning the parquet
floor, even if he must not adopt the intention of doing a, use chemicab.
I will sketch a first formalization of these notions, based on [Cohen and Levesque, 1990b1, in
chap. 5.
Second, dealing with purpose clauses, and with naturally occurring action descriptions in
general, raises interesting issues with respect t o the action formalism that we should employ.
Some preliminary conclusions are that we should be able t o represent actions at different levels of
specificity, and that generation and enablement should be included among the relations holding
between actions.
Third, the abundance of purpose clauses in naturally occurring instructions can help focus
the accommodation process, both in suggesting the kind of inferences that need to be done, and
in offering a way t o direct such inferences.
In sect. 2.1.3 1 sketched two kinds of accommodation that directly derive from purpose clauses,
namely, inferring the assumptions under which a certain instruction makes sense, and deriving a
more specific description of the action to be executed, by applying to it the constraints deriving
from the goal.
4Goldman himself allows for sequences of actions t o generate another action
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see [Goldman, 19701.

The solution I have adopted so far to deal with the latter kind of inference is t o use hybrid
knowledge representation systems [Brachman et al., 19901. However, such representation lacks
a well-defined set of semantic primitives, necessary to provide a sound lexical decomposition
for verbs. I found a source for such semantic primitives in Jackendoff's conceptual structures
[Jackendoff, 19901. Part of my proposal will then be to integrate the two frameworks together.
All these issues will be discussed in more detail in chap. 5.

Chapter 4

Negative irnperat ives
In this chapter, I will consider the following two questions:
1. Negative imperatives are not limited t o don't do a. Are different kinds of negative imperatives used exactly in the same way, or does their distribution tell us something on the
expectations that S has on the intentions H may adopt?

2. What inference processes does H perform to understand negative imperatives? In particular, what role - if any - does the concept of goal play? Consider:

Ex. 23 Caring for the floor. A good paste wax - not a water-based wax - will give added
protection t o the wood. B u g about twice a year; wax about once a year. Excessive waxing
can cause wax to build up, detracting from the floor appearance.
Dust-mop or vacuum your parquet floor as you would carpeting. Do not scrub or wetmop the parquet. Use a damp cloth to remove fresh food spills.

H will understand the negative imperative by recognizing that dust-mop, vacuum, scrub,
wet-mop, are all possible candidates for achieving the goal of cleaning the parquet; and
that, although scrub and wet-mop may in general be performed to achieve a goal such as
cleaning floor, they are not a viable alternative in this case.
The question is then, what kind of relations the actions described in negative imperatives
bear t o one another and to a possible more general goal that has already been established
- I am talking about already established goal because all the examples I found are interpreted with respect t o the previous, and not the following, text. Making sure that this
generalization really holds is part of future work.
As we will see, the two questions are not independent, namely, different kinds of negative imperatives in general perform different functions, and concern actions that bear different relations
to one another.
In the following, I will classify the data into two general classes, on the basis of the expectations that S has on the intentions that H may or may not adopt; I will then discuss some
consequences of the analysis of negative imperatives for a model of the inferences H has to make.

4.1

T h e data

negative imperatives proper,
There seem to be two basic classes of negative imperatives
characterized either by the negative auxiliary don't 2 , or by negative polarity items, such as
never and nothing; the other class is formed by verbs such as take care, be sure and the like T C verbs for short - followed by a negative infinitival complement, such as ('not to ...", or ('to
... negative polarity item ...". I will call the former class of imperatives the D O N T type and
the latter the neg- T C type 3 .
The data is distributed as follows:
1. 36 instances of the DONT type, and in particular

(a) 32 with don't or do not:

Ex. 2 4 Your sheet vinylfloor may be vinyl asbestos, which is no longer on the market.
Don't sand it or tear it up because this will put dangerous asbestos fibers into the
air. It must be covered over.
(b) 4 with never

Ex. 2 5 Never mix cleaners containing acid or ammonia with chlorine bleach.
The chemical reaction releases the chlorine as a poisonous gas.
2. 29 examples of the neg-TC type:

(a) 4 with take care

Ex. 26 To book the strip, fold the bottom third or more of the strip over the middle of
the panel, pasted sides together, taking care not t o crease the wallpaper sharply
a t the fold.
(b) 4 with be sure or make sure

Ex. 27 To wash, load clothes into tub, making sure not t o overfill it.
(c) 22 with be careful

Ex. 28 If your plans call for replacing the wood base molding with vinyl cove molding,
be careful not t o damage the walls as you remove the wood base.

4.2

Different uses for different negative imperatives

As far as semantics goes, it is clear that a DONT imperative could be used when a neg-TC
one is used: an expression like take care not to do cr entails don't do a 4 . In fact, in terse
'1 collected data from ttvo "how-to-do" books, both from the Sunset publication company - VI'aII Coverings
and Tile - plus a few from detergent and toiletry containers.
21 a m not distinguishing between don't and do not.
3Negative imperatives can also be formed by means of negated modals, such as shouldn't. Presumably such
instances could b e reduced t o DONT imperatives, although this characterization doesn't seem to b e totally
appropriate. Given t h a t I found only one such example, I won't consider them in t h e following.
'It is not clear what entails really means here, given that instructions are difficult t o model in the usual
model-theoretic semantics. I a m using this term in an intuitive sense.

instructions only DONT imperatives are found. However, the instructions I have looked at
come from instructional text, and there the two classes of negative imperatives are indeed used
in different ways, that depend on the expectations S has on the intentions H will adopt - notice
that in this proposal I will not address the problem of why S has such expectations. The two
classes of negative imperatives pattern as follows:

DONT imperatives. Don't do a appears to be used when S thinks that H is likely t o adopt
the intention to perform a, and wants to prevent H from adopting it.
That there is a correlation between S's expectation about the intentions which H is likely
to adopt, the use of a DONT imperative, and the real likelihood that H adopts those
intentions is shown by an infelicitous usage of a - really occurring! - DONT imperative:

Ex. 2 9 # If you must replace a tile, first cut around the edges with a circular saw. Set
the blade to the depth of the tile and don't damage adjoining tiles.

Damaging x is hardly an intention that an agent would normally adopt, so that using a
D O N T imperative results in an infelicitous utterance: I will come back to this example in
sect. 4.2.3.
Neg-TC imperatives. A form like '(Do p. Take care not to do a " appears to be used when S
wants H t o perform a certain /3 and thinks that H may adopt the intention of performing it
in an undesirable way, or that H may NOT adopt the intention of preventing an undesirable
consequence of /3 - a describes such an undesirable feature.
It appears that in general lexical items such as take care draw H's attention to something
he may otherwise overlook, both in negative and in positive imperatives:
Ex. 30 For paint spots on arms and hands, rub lightly with thinner, working quickly. O n
face and neck, dab the spots o n with a cloth dipped in thinner. Be extremely careful to
keep t h e thinner away froin your eyes.
As when T C verbs are used in negative imperatives, we have an action ,O "dab the spots off
with a cloth dipped i n thinner" that has to be performed under the additional constraint
o '(keeping the thinner away from your eyes".
However, it appears that when TC verbs are used in negative imperatives there always is
a p in discourse which a is meant t o constrain; on the other hand, a preliminary analysis
of occurrences of TC verbs in positive imperatives shows that they can also be used in the
absence of such p:

Ex. 31 Be sure to read the adhesive manufacturer's instructions carefully.
In this case, be sure seems to be used only for added emphasis, to stress the importance
of reading the adhesive manufacturer's instructions carefully..
My conclusion, which I will support with further evidence in the rest of this chapter, is that
neg-TC imperatives express more than simple negation. A thorough analysis of TC verbs
used in positive imperatives will be instrumental in analyzing their behavior in negative
imperatives too.

I will now justify the different characterizations proposed for DONT and neg-TC imperatives;
in sect. 4.3 I will provide more precise specifications.

DONT imperatives

4.2.1

The expression I will examine in this section is Don't do a , which may be used by S t o convey
t o H that
a is a n undesirable alternative t o a ,El that S tells H t o do. a may come t o H7s mind by
analogy, as an alternative to some other ,El that S suggests, as in Ex. 23, whose relevant
part is repeated here again for convenience:

not a water-based wax - will give added
protection to the wood. ... Dust-mop or vacuum your parquet floor as you would carpeting.
Do not scrub o r wet-mop t h e parquet.

Ex. 32 Caring for the floor. A good paste wax

-

As I stated in the introduction to this chapter, the goal t o be achieved is y "cleaning the
parquet". Notice that this is not stated explicitly, but requires a step of plan recognition:
this step will probably take advantage of the fact that the whole paragraph is under the
heading Caring for the floor, which is presented as subdivided into waxing and cleaning.
S suggests t o H two methods to achieve this goal, and then prevents H from thinking that
other apparently equivalent methods could be used.
Ex. 32 is particularly "clean", in that the fact that scrub and wet-mop are (undesirable)
alternatives with respect to dust-mop and vacuum can be easily inferred
1. either by using an action inheritance hierarchy and by modeling all these actions as
daughters of the same parent, clean floor;

2. or by modeling them as different methods to achieve the same goal clean floor, and
reasoning "backwards" from the goal t o understand what all these actions have in
common.
In other cases, the knowledge that may suggest cr to H as an alternative t o ,El is more
complex:

Ex. 33 Step 4. Lift brush straight up, letting excess paint drip back into pail. Gently slap
both sides of brush against inside of pail two or three times. Don't wipe brush across
lip of pail, or bristles may separate into clumps, leaving less paint o n brush.
Slap and wipe can be seen as alternative ways of getting rid of excess paint on the brush
in addition t o letting it drip, which is a slow way of accomplishing such goal. However,
the fact that wipe is an alternative t o slap and that S feels the need to caution H against it
comes from general knowledge about what people do with brushes loaded with an excessive
amount of some kind of viscous substance.

-

Notice the importance of the goal y in understanding Exs. 32 and 33: in the former the
goal is cleaning the parquet, in the latter getting rid of excessive paint from the brush.
Understanding that the relation between the actions to be performed - e.g. vacuum and the undesirable ones - e.g. scrub - is one of alternative requires understanding the
common goal that they all achieve.
Therefore, D O N T imperatives provide more evidence about the necessary role that goals
play in understanding the relations between the described actions.

a may state a general goal, independent from other actions in the discourse. S tells H not
to adopt an intention relative t o some general tasks. The actions not t o be performed are
independent from other actions in the discourse. Of course, they may be related t o other
more general goals, that either have already been established, such as Hang wallpaper in
Ex. 34 below, or that are generally held as desirable, such as Don't put anybody's health
i n jeopardy, which underlies Ex. 24 above. Consider:

Ex. 34 If you're using a lightweight or porous wallpaper, profit from these "don'ts":
a. Don't hang the wallpaper over dark painted walls; it could show through. Lighten
the walls with a pat, oil-base enamel undercoat before hanging the wallpuper.
b. Don't paper over a dark colored or patterned wall covering. First, lighten the
background with paint or lining paper.
c. Don't hang the wallpaper over an existing wallpaper i f the ink from the existing
covering comes off; it could bleed through the new covering. To test, moisten a small piece
of the covering with a clean sponge. If the ink comes ofS, seal the old covering first.
Other. Don't do a can be used to tell H that an action ,O should not be followed by a , in
particular if a affects the outcome of P. Consider:

Ex. 35 Use a vinyl-to-vinyl paste for any type of border you plan to hang over wallpaper.
To paste the border for hanging, cover the entire back with paste and book the strip; don't
crease the folds.

The action booking the strip creates folds; the action of creasing the folds is seen as independent from booking, and H is told not to perform it.
There are few additional cases in which a D O N T imperative is used t o caution H against
possible side-effects of a certain action, or against possible undesirable ways of executing
it, or t o give termination conditions for it:

Ex. 36 The tiles will cut more easily if warmed i n sunlight or over a furnace vent. Don't
overheat or the tiles may scorch or melt.
Ex. 37 After washing the tile, rinse it thoroughly to remove detergent film; then wipe with
a soft, dry cloth. For stubborn dirt, scrub tiles with a white, cleansing powder. Don't use
a cleaner containing bleach; this can pull the color out of the colored grouts.
Actually the generalization that D O N T imperatives are used when S thinks H may adopt
an intention t o do a does not seem t o hold for the last two examples. For example, in
Ex. 37, rather than consciously adopt the intention of using such a cleaner, it is more likely
that H may overlook the fact that the cleaner he chooses contains bleach: as we will see,
these are typical cases in which a neg-TC verb is used.

I will come back t o these example in sect. 4.2.3.

4.2.2

N e g - T C imperatives

Neg-TC imperatives caution H against either undesirable ways of performing the action P that
S intends H to perform, or undesirable consequences of P. That the negated action a is strictly
linked t o P is also shown by the fact that many instances of neg-TC imperatives are adjuncts
t o the matrix clause describing P , resulting in patterns such as '(Do P, taking care not to do a".
Given an imperative TC-verb not to do a , a may be:

An undesirable way of performing P. The description of ,D is always underspecified, and
therefore H has many degrees of freedom in executing it. Consider:
Ex. 38 To make a piercing cut, first drill a hole i n the waste stock o n the interior of the
pattern. The diameter of the hole must be larger than the width of the blade. If you want to
save the waste stock for later use, drill the hole near a corner i n the pattern. B e careful
not to drill through the pattern line.

p is drill a hole near a corner i n the pattern. The interpretation of near still leaves H
some choices as regards the exact position where t o drill: S constrains them by saying Be
careful not to drill through the pattern line, having already warned H that the hole must
be larger than the width of the blade.
An undesirable effect of

P.

1. The undesirable effect may spring from the manner in which H performs a certain
action, and be entirely under H7s control:

Ex. 39 Make a small 1/4-inch slit i n the center of each area to be stuffed. B e careful
not to snip the surface fabric.
Another very common way of expressing a (generic) side-effect t o be avoided is by
means of verbs like ruin, damage, mar etc:

Ex. 40 W h e n nailing the panels, be careful not to mar the surfaces.

Ex. 41 If your plans call for replacing the wood base molding with vinyl cove molding,
be careful not t o damage the walls as you remove the wood base.
2. The undesirable consequence of P may depend on external laws not under H's control:
the only thing H can do is prevent such events from happening.

Ex. 4 2 To hang the border, begin at the least conspicuous corner. The work will go
much faster if you have someone hold the folded section while you apply the border
to the wall. Take care not t o drip paste onto the wall and be sure to remove
excess paste.
Gravity governs the dripping of paste: H has t o perform P in such a way that a does
not happen. Notice that the agent can perceive a while doing P. In situations where
the agent can't perceive a , it would be more felicitous t o say check that a doesn't
happen.

An explicit culmination point for actions that describe monotonic processes:

Ex. 43 To wash, load clothes into tub, m a k i n g s u r e n o t t o overfill it.
Load clothes into tub has a default culmination condition, which here is reinforced by the
explicit making sure not to overfill it.
4.2.3

F u r t h e r e v i d e n c e f o r the t w o classes of negative imperatives

If the two types of negative imperatives do pattern in the way I illustrated, even if such pragmatic
functions are not completely clear cut, we should expect t o find some cases in which the usage
of one instead of the other results in an infelicitous utterance. As I mentioned in sect. 4.2, I did
find such an example in my data, repeated here again for convenience:

Ex. 44 # If you must replace a tile, first cut around the edges with a circular saw. Set the
blade to the depth of the tile and don't d a m a g e adjoining tiles.
As I said, S uses D O N T imperatives when she thinks H is likely to adopt the intention to
perform a , unless explicitly told not to. However, damage is hardly an intention that a person
adopts in the context of building or repairing an artifact: rather, it is an undesirable side-effect
that can result from a careless execution of a.
I conducted an informal experiment to test whether my intuitions are correct, and whether
using Take care not to damage adjoining tiles would be more felicitous. My informants agreed
with my judgement, and pointed out that the presence of the conjunction is another source of
infelicity. In fact, conjunction should be used t o relate two conjuncts that have the same function
in discourse, but here the two conjuncts are, respectively, a subpart of the action of cutting the
tile, and a possible negative consequence of such an action. However, all my informants rated
conjunction as having a less conspicuous effect than using don't instead of take care not to.
A last remark on the difference in the usage of these two classes of negative imperatives.
That they achieve different results holds even for some apparent counterexamples, in which the
two forms of negative imperatives seem to be used interchangeably. Consider the following pair
- the first member is Ex. 35, repeated here for convenience:

Ex. 45 a. Use a vinyl-to-vinyl paste for any type of border you plan to hang over wallpaper. To
paste the border for Izanging, cover the entire back with paste and book the strip; don't c r e a s e
t h e folds.
b. To book the strip, fold the bottom third or more of the strip over the middle of the panel,
pasted sides together, t a k i n g c a r e n o t to c r e a s e t h e w a l l p a p e r s h a r p l y at t h e fold.
Although similar, the two examples are not completely equivalent.
In Ex. 45.a) the usage of a DONT imperative shows that the two actions of booking the strip
and creasing the folds are seen as a sequence of separate actions. That is, S tells H to perform
book the strip. Book the strip creates folds: S intends H not to perform crease on the result of
the previous action, after such result has been created.
In Ex. 45.b, S explains t o H how t o book a strip. Folding is explicitly mentioned as part of
such "recipe"; creasing the folds is seen as a possible culmination of folding, and therefore as a
part of booking the strips.

In ch. 5 I show how the Ex. 45.a and .b can be treated

-

seefigs. 5.7 and 5.8.

In sect. 4.2.1, I mentioned that Exs. 37 and 36 are counterexamples t o my characterization
of DONT imperatives. This could be simply due t o the fact that the respective functions of
DONT and neg-TC imperatives are not completely clear cut, because, as far as semantics goes,
wherever a neg-TC imperative is used, a DONT imperative could be used; and in fact, DONT
imperatives are used when the style of the instructions is terse.
As regards Ex. 36 - Don't overheat [the tiles] - my feeling is that it could perhaps be accounted
for in the same way Ex. 45.a is accounted for: namely, S shows that she is viewing overheating
as a separate action from warming.

4.3

Consequences for a cornputat ional model of instructions

A first intuitive characterization of the different effects that DONT and neg- T C imperatives
have on the hearer could be:
D O N T : GOAL(H, NOT(perform(H, a ) ) )

As with purpose clauses, I will work out the details of the speaker / hearer model in the
next chapter. An interesting parallel between purpose clauses and neg-TC imperatives arises:
in the same way that the generator a is constrained by the generatee P contained in the purpose
clause, so in many T C verb not to a examples, the action ,L? to be performed is constrained by
a. Also in this case, therefore, we have to resort to accommodation as the process that accounts
for such inferences.
One point that I have not addressed at all so far is why S has such expectations on the
intentions that H may or may not adopt. Clearly S must have a user model of some sort in
mind, but given that instructional text addresses an audience, not an individual, it must be the
case that S has certain general expectations of her audience, such as level of expertise etc. To
model S's beliefs in such a way that one can predict her expectations is a very interesting topic
in itself, a topic that I don't plan t o address in the course of my thesis, but which I may touch
upon.
As far as the inferences that H has to perform to understand the (possible) relations of
a t o p, I would first like to distinguish between internal and external relations between two
actions: internal relations include a being a specialization, or a side-effect, or a culmination of P ;
external include alternative, generation, enablement 5. I would characterize DONT imperatives
as indicating an external and neg-TC an internal relation between a and P.
D O N T imperatives. If there is a P to which a relates, such a relation will typically be external,
namely, a and ,L? will not be part of each other, or one a consequence of the other. To
understand the relation holding between them, it is often the case that H needs to resort
to a third action y, for example a mutually accepted goal such as cleaning the parquet in
Ex. 32. A step of plan recognition may be required to infer y.
'The status of temporal relations with respect to being internal or external is not clear.

As I said, style and conciseness can result in DONT imperatives being used instead of negT C ones; therefore, we could hypothesize that by default H will start by postulating the
existence of an external relation between a and ,L? in the presence of a DONT imperative.
This default can be easily overridden, for example if H knows that the instructions he is
dealing with are terse, so that only DONT imperatives are used; or if there is a particular
lexical item, such as use, which, having little meaning by itself, triggers the hypothesis
that there is an action t o which it can be internally related.
Neg-TC imperatives. The relation between a and ,L? is internal. Sometimes the NL surface
forms help in identifying such relations more precisely: in Exs. 38 and 39, such inference
processes are made easier by the fact that either the same verb, drill, or two closely related
verbs, (make a) slit and snip, are respectively used for ,L? and a.

Chapter 5

A computational model of
instruct ions
In this chapter, I will propose a model for understanding instructions, based on the evidence
about the accommodation processes and about purpose clauses and negative imperatives I presented in the previous chapters. Such model will account for the initial intentions H develops
when he understands an imperative, and for the inference processes that he performs t o refine
his initial understanding.
Such model will be composed of
1. a speaker / hearer model of imperatives based on [Cohen and Levesque, 1990b1, t o account
for the initial intentions H adopts;

2. an action representation formalism that integrates hybrid knowledge representation systems and Jackendoff's lexical semantic representation, t o facilitate accommodation inferences;

3. inference processes that build a structured representation of H's intentions
graph.

5.1

A speaker

/

-

the plan

hearer model of imperatives

Following [Cohen and Levesque, 1990b1, I intend t o provide axioms on the basis of which the
intentions H adopts while interpreting complex imperatives can be accounted for; in particular,
I am talking about the intentions that H adopts as an initial "response" to the imperative. Such
formalization could be used to model S's beliefs as well, in order t o predict the way in which
she will phrase her instructions, but this is left for future work.
One may wonder why it is necessary t o provide such an axiomatization, given that I will also
provide a representation for the structure of H's intentions, and inference processes that build
it. Conversely, one may wonder why building the structure of H's intentions is necessary, when
through the axiomatization one can account for the intentions H adopts. The answer is that in
fact these two parts of the model account for different parts of H's intentions. In particular:

1. Such axiomatization is a declarative representation that links surface form of an utterance
and H's intentions. Its first task is to model communication between S and H: therefore,
starting with S's goals in uttering a certain kind of imperative, to account for the beliefs
and intentions that H will adopt on the basis of such utterance. The second task of such
axiomatization is to model what other intentions and beliefs H may adopt on the basis of
those he derived from the input utterance I .

Such formalization will then allow us t o make predictions about the intentions that H will
adopt in a more principled way than by triggering procedures. It could also be useful t o
account for the way a speaker generates a certain kind of imperative, and ultimately, for
generating such utterances.
2. Having both the axiomatization and the inference processes that build the plan graph
helps to keep distinct the intentions that the agent adopts as a "response" to the input
instructions, and those that are adopted as a consequence of accessing the knowledge the
agent has about the actions. Keeping them distinct is necessary because accommodation
heavily depends on default assumptions. For example, by accommodation we will infer that
in Turn screw to loosen the real action to be performed is Turn screw counte~lockwise.
This inference depends on the assumption that the screw in question is left-handed. If H
later discovers that the screw is actually right-handed, his commitment t o loosening the
screw should be maintained, while the commitment to turn the screw counterclockwise
should be changed into the commitment to turn the screw clockwise. Therefore we must
keep track of how these intentions were arrived at.

To keep things simple, I will model a cooperative agent that will adopt intentions to
perform all the actions that S instructs him t o do. Clearly, this obedient agent is severely
limited; as we will see, in Cohen and Levesque's model H adopts an intention a if a is not
contrary to his own goals. If in the future I extend the model t o deal with more complex
agents, this feature will provide a point from where to start.
On the other hand, such an axiomatization is not sufficient, and building the plan graph is
necessary because the axiomatization only helps t o predict which intentions H will adopt,
but not t o compute the exact objects of such intentions, or t o understand how different
intentions relate to each other. The plan graph keeps track of such relations; for example,
when interpreting sequences of imperatives, the structure of the plan graph built so far
helps t o understand the next instruction. The axiomatic model only provides for the
intentions that H adopts in answer to an imperative, not for how such intentions relate to
others that H may have already adopted.

5.1.1

Cohen a n d Levesque's illode1

In [1990b], Cohen and Levesque present a model of a cooperative agent. I will first give an
overview of the logic at the basis of their model, as they report on it in [1990a] 2 .
'Pollack in her thesis [I9861 presents a formalization of beliefs and intentions that is aimed a t the latter task.
Although she does address the problem of H modeling S' beliefs underlying a given request, she is not concerned
with the task of mapping a given surface form into such beliefs and intentions.
'In fact, I will exploit Allen's comments on their formalism in that same book [Allen, 19901.

T h e logic
Cohen and Levesque develop a modal logic whose model theory is based on a possible-worlds
semantics. Their logic has four primary modal operators: BELief, GOAL, HAPPENS (which
event happens next), DONE (which event has just occurred).
T i m e is expressed by means of time propositions, which are just numerals -for ease of exposition
Cohen and Levesque represent them as dates. These will be true or false in a course of
events a t a given index if and only if the index is the same as that denoted by the time
proposition. To express that an event E has to happen at time t , they use conjunction,
namely, E A t .
A c t i o n expressions. They define primitive events, such as physical movements, etc. On top
of those they build complex action expressions, by means of the standard operators of
dynamic logic [Moore, 19801: composition " ;", non-deterministic choice " I " , test " ?",
repetition " "".
T e m p o r a l modalities. HAPPENS(a) is true at some index point on a world when there is
a subsequent (future) index point on that world such that a describes the sequence of
events between the two index points; DONE(a) is true a t some index point when there is
a previous (past) index point such that a describes the sequence of events between the two
index points. HAPPENS(x, a) and DONE(x, a) specify that x is the agent of a. Cohen
and Levesque also use 0 and U, glossed as Eventually and Always respectively.
BELief. They assume the usual Hintikka-style axiom schemata [Halpern and Moses, 19851:

(la)
(lb)
(Ic)
(Id)

I= v x B E L (x, P ) A B E L ( 2, (P q)) BEL (x, q)
I= V x BEL(x, p) BEL(x, BEL(x, p))
I= V x BEL(x, p) + BEL(x, BEL(x, p))
I= V x BEL(x, p) + BEL(x, l p ) )
+

+

-+

1

1

1

They introduce KNOW by definition:
Definition 1 II'NOW(x, p) = p A BEL(x, p)
GOAL. An agent has many, possibly conflicting, desires. Among those he chooses his goals,
namely, those desires he wants most t o see fulfilled. Goals are modeled as propositions
true in all of the agent's chosen worlds. The following proposition holds:
Proposition 1

i=

(BEL x p)

+

(GOAL x p)

namely, worlds compatible with an agent's goals must be included in those compatible
with his beliefs: given a set of worlds that are possible given what an agent believes, a
subset of these are the worlds in which the agent's goals are achieved.
Notice that - I am quoting from [Allen, 19901 - the formula G O A L ( x , p ) does not assert
that the agent x has p as a goal i n the intuitive sense of the word. Rather, it says that
p will be true i n any world where the agent's goals are achieved. In some ways, the term
((consequence-of-goals" might be a better term name for the operator.

By means of the definition of goal, Cohen and Levesque define the concept of persistent goal,
and on top of it, the concept of intention.
Persistent goal, P-GOAL(x, p). An agent x has a P-GOAL p if he has a goal p that he
believes currently t o be false and that he will continue to choose - at least as long as a
given condition q remains valid. At first, they define q as saying that the agent won't give
up p until he has achieved it, or until he believes that p will never be true. Later, they relax
this "fanaticism" requirement by defining a persistent goal relative to r, P-R-GOAL(x, p,
r), where r is q with a third disjunct u added: the agent will keep the goal p until he has
achieved it, or he believes that p will never be true, or he believes that another condition
u is not true any more, where u can for example be the reason why the agent adopted p
in the first place.
Intention, INTEND(x, p, q). Finally, they define intention as a kind of persistent goal - that
is, a persistent goal to do an action, believing one is about to do it, or to achieve some
state of affairs, believing one is about to achieve it. Being a P-R-GOAL, an intention will
be relative to a certain condition q 3 .
A m o d e l for rational interaction
By means of the logic defined above, Cohen and Levesque develop a model for rational intemction. They model agents as being sincere and helpful.
An agent x is sincere with respect to another agent y and a certain proposition p, if, whenever
x has chosen to do something next in order to cause y to believe p, x has chosen to bring it
about that y knows p, i.e. that y believes p, and p holds.
An agent x is helpful to another agent y if, for any action a, x adopts y's goal that x will
eventually do a. Helpfulness is a disposition only: not taking on another agent's goals does
not indicate unhelpfulness, since the agent may have reasons for not wanting the goal. The
helpfulness assumption is as follows 4 :
A s s u m p t i o n 1 HELPFUL(x,y) A
BEL(x, GOAL(y, O(DONE(x, a ) ) ) A
i(GOAL(x, 07(DONE(x, a ) )
+
INTEND(x, a,
[HELPFUL(x, y) A GOAL(y, ODONE(x, a))])
The preceding assumption reads as follows. If agent x
a

is HELPFUL to agent y;

a

believes that y wants him to perform a, namely, y has the goal that x will eventually
perform a ;

3 ~ c t u a l l y they
,
define two operators, INTEND1 and INTEND2, distinguished because t h e object of t h e intention is respectively actions and states of affairs. Given t h a t I will talk only about intentions to d o an action,
namely, INTEND1, I will drop t h e subscript.
*I report formulas from [Cohen and Levesque, 1990bl verbatim, apart from possibly substituting variable names
t o keep them consistent with the abbreviations I have used in this proposal.

a

doesn't have any reason not to perform a, namely, he doesn't have among his own goals
that he will never perform a ,

then x will commit t o a, under the assumption that x remains helpfully disposed and that y
doesn't change his mind with respect t o x doing a.
Cohen and Levesque define the notions of Alternating BELief and Belief in Mutual Belief,
ABEL and BMB respectively:

Definition 2 ABEL(n, x, y, p) = B E L ( x, B E L ( y, B E L ( x , . . . B E L ( x, p ) ...)
L

+
n

'V
n

Definition 3 B M B ( x, y, p) = V n A B E L ( n, x, y, p)
Finally, Cohen and Levesque characterize utterance properties. They start by giving a general
definition relating an utterance in a certain syntactic mode @ and the beliefs that H adopts as
a consequence of such utterance. Such definition, informally stated, is:

Definition 4 If H believes that e was just done, where e is the uttering by S of a sentence $ i n
syntactic mode a, and i f H does not believe that e was done insincerely regarding certain core
attitudes A associated with utterances of that type, then H believes that A hold.
In the formal definition, ABEL, not BEL, is used, and it is required that ABEL holds at any
level of alternating belief. Therefore, if at each level S's sincerity is believed, we obtain that S
and H mutually believe A. The properties characterizing the various syntactic modes a ' s are
modeled by axioms of the sort

As far as imperatives are concerned, Cohen and Levesque attribute them the following property:

After speaker S's imperative to addressee H to do action a , if H does not think that
S was insincere about his wanting H to do a - that is, if H does not believe that S
wanted H t o believe falsely that S wants H to do a - then H believes that S wants H
to do a.
This translates t o the following domain axiom for imperatives

Axiom 1

I= IMPERATIVE($)

GOAL(S, 0 [ 3 a [ DONE(H, a ) A
FULFILL-CONDS(#J,a)])
namely, S's GOAL when uttering the imperative C$ is that H performs a which FULFILLS the
satisfaction conditions imposed by sentence 4. In [1990b, p.2351, Cohen and Levesque acknowledge that FULFILL-CONDS is just a placeholder for a semantic theory that can characterize
the meanings of imperatives. The only requirement we make for analyzing imperatives is that
such a semantic theory have the capacity to supply predicates (or properties) that are true of
events, especially the utterance event itself.

By applying def. 4 to Axiom 1, we can conclude

'

BMB(S, H, GOAL(S, 0 [ 3 a [DONE(H, a ) A
FULFILL-CONDS(q5, a)]]))
If we substitute such belief into the second conjunct in the antecedent of Assum. 1, we can
conclude:
INTEND(x, a , [HELPFUL(x, y) A GOAL(y, ODONE(x, a))]
where a is the a relative to S's desires.

5.1.2

Extensions to Cohen and Levesque's model

I will now refine the axiom for imperatives given above by providing axioms first for positive
imperatives containing purpose clauses and then for negative imperatives. The reader may
wonder why the general axiom for imperatives is not sufficient: one might as well leave it as
it is, and reason about intentions and objects t o intentions in a different part of the model.
However, this would not be correct. I claim that, after S utters an imperative containing a
purpose clause or a neg-TC, H adopts more specific intentions than those predicted by Axiom
1: therefore, the model must be able t o capture these more specific effects.
Purpose Clauses
In Ch. 3, I attributed the following property to positive imperatives containing purpose clauses:
Do a to do ,L? is used t o tell H that he should adopt the intention to do P; and that a contributes
to achieving P, which in turn constrains the interpretation / execution of a. I also observed
that, although S's intention is that H also adopts a as one of his intentions, P has priority: if
H adopts another method y t o achieve P, S won't object to it, as long as y is not against S's
intentions and beliefs 5 .
Finally, I defined two kinds of accommodation processes, one that computes a more specific
action description a', the other that coillputes the assumptions under which the relation between
a and ,L? makes sense.

I will provide two axioms: the former, Axiom 2, models the communicative act between S
and H. On the basis of Axiom 2 and other axioms previously established, I will conclude what
intentions and beliefs H adopts, upon hearing or reading such an imperative. By applying the
other axiom, Axiom 3, t o such newly acquired intentions and beliefs, I will model the beliefs
and intentions that H holds with respect to the objects of the accommodation inferences.
Axiom 2 is as follows - FULFILL-CONDS-PC is a specialized version of FULFILL-CONDS,

B denotes the purpose clause in q5, CONTRIBUTES is a generic name for the relation between a
and ,O that is embodied in purpose clauses; also notice that I am using A and B t o keep distinct
surface form and action expressions:
5 ~ o example,
r
a teacher telling a student study more to get better marks, won't be satisfied if H adopts the
"method" of cheating on t h e exam, in order t o get better marks.

Axiom 2

Do-A-to-do-B($)

b) GOAL(S, 0 [3 a [ DONE(H, a ) A
FULFILL- CONDS-PC(A, a )
BEL(H, CONTRIBUTES (HAPPENS(H, a ) ,
HAPPENS(H, P)))11)
Substituting the first conjunct (2.a) into the antecedent of the helpfulness assumption
Assum. 1, we get

-

where q are the assumptions of helpfulness etc., as discussed above.
As regards the second conjunct (2.b), it may be questionable whether DONE (H, a ) should
be included, given my observation above that the goal O, has more importance than a : however,
I will keep it for the moment. Reasoning exactly as for (2.a), we will obtain

Moreover, from the belief part of 2.b, Def. 4, and an axiom relative to informative acts
will get

6 , we

BMB(S, H, CONTRIBUTES ( HAPPENS (H, a ) , HAPPENS (H, P)))

I will now introduce the second axiom, that no longer concerns the communicative situation, but
characterizes H's mental processes after he has acquired the intentions of doing ,B and a , and the
belief that a contributes t o achieving P, from a purpose clause: either H will adopt the intention
t o perform a', which is a constrained by P ; or there will be another belief, $, that H has to
have in order for the CONTRIBUTES relation t o make sense - in the axiom, CONSTRAINED
is meant t o be true of an action a' which is a constrained by the fact that a CONTRIBUTES
t o p, and CONTRIBUTESl is the CONTRIBUTES relation "augmented" with the assumption
$:
6To be defined.

Axiom 3 'F INTEND(H, P, q) A INTEND(H, a ) A
BEL(H, CONTRIBUTES ( HAPPENS (H, a ) , HAPPENS (H, P)))
a) [3a' [ INTEND(H, a', q) A
BEL(H, CONSTRAINED
(a', a , CONTRIBUTES (HAPPENS (H, a ) ,
HAPPENS(H, P))) A
BEL(H, CONTRIBUTES (HAPPENS (H, a'), HAPPENS (H, P)))]

v
b) [ BEL(H7 $1 A
BEL(H, CONTRIBUTESl ( HAPPENS (H, a ) , HAPPENS (H, P),

I)$

Disjunct a) is meant t o capture the first kind of accommodation, namely, the fact that the
action which H has to perform may be a more specialized version of a ; notice that INTEND(H,
a', q) is supposed t o "substitute", in some sense, INTEND(H, a , q). Actually i t is consistent
that the two intentions coexist, because a is an abstraction of a': however, I wonder whether
having them coexist is a perspicuous representation of H's intentions - I will address this point
in my future work.
Disjunct b) is meant to capture the second kind of accommodation, the one that takes
place when the CONTRIBUTES relation needs an assumption $ in order to make sense.
CONTRIBUTESl is very similar, at least intuitively, t o CGEN - conditional generation - that
Pollack defined [1986]: the definition of conditional generation rests on the assumption that there
are conditions that have to hold for the generation relation to go through. CONTRIBUTESl
is more general than CGEN, in that it should subsume both generation and enablement, and
that there are assumptions that help "make sense" of it; the definitions of CONTRIBUTES and
CONTRIBUTESl are left for future work.
Axiom 3 is clearly descriptive: it just mentions that H believes that a more specific a'
contributes to ,8, or that there is an assumption $ that under which CONTRIBUTES( HAPPENS (H, a ) , HAPPENS(H, P)) goes through. However, nothing is said about how a' or $
are arrived at. Instead of providing inference rules t o compute such objects, I'd rather keep the
axioms as a way to account for the initial intentions H adopts, and I will use other parts of the
model - namely, the inferences that build the plan graph - t o compute the actual objects of H7s
intentions.
Finally, I would like t o point out that Axiom 3, as stated, is incorrect: in fact, it may be
applied every time H intends a certain P, and he believes there is an a that contributes to P.
This would entail, for example, that, if H knows more than one a that contributes t o P , H can
commit t o all such a's, possibly modified t o be a'. Instead, this axiom should be applicable only
when there is some more evidence for H committing to a', as for example the fact that these
intentions and beliefs come from purpose clauses. This applicability condition has to be added.
Negative imperatives

On the basis of the results established in ch. 4, I propose the following characterizations:

DONT imperatives. Don't do A is used when S thinks that H is likely t o adopt the intention
to perform a , and wants t o prevent H from adopting it.

Axiom 4 (DONT)

+ Don't-do-A(4)
*

GOAL(S,

3 a [DONE(H, a ) A
FULFILL-CONDS-DONT(A, a)]])

[
i

From Axiom 4, the Helpfulness assumption, and Def. 4, we can conclude
INTEND(H, ol(DONE(H, a ) ) , q)
As the reader may recall, there are cases in which DONT imperatives behave like neg-TC
imperatives:'in those cases, Axiom 4 should not apply. Given that Axiom 4 describes the
default use of DONT imperatives, it should probably be restated as an assumption.

Neg-TC imperatives. "Do B. Take care not to do A'' is used when S wants H t o perform B
and thinks that H may NOT adopt the intention of preventing an undesirable consequence
of B,or may adopt the intention of performing B in an undesirable way - where A describes
the undesirable feature t o be avoided.
The schema for neg-TC imperatives is similar to the one for purpose clauses, therefore
highlighting the similarity of these two constructions. I will provide two axioms, Axioms
5 and 6: the former will model the communicative act taking place between S and H, and
will allow me to infer the intentions and beliefs that H derives from the utterance. The
latter axiom, applied to the conclusions of the former, will model the reasoning that H
engages in subsequently.
A first approximation for Axiom 5 follows - AVOID (IN ( HAPPENS( H, P), HAPPENS(H, a ) ) ) indicates that a is an undesirable feature of P:

Axiom 5 (neg-TC)

Do-B.-Talre-care-not-to-do-A(4)
==+
GOAL(S, 0 [3P [ DONE(H, P ) A
FULFILL-CONDS(B, P)]]) A
GOAL(S, 0 [3a [ BMB(S, H,
AVOID ( IN ( HAPPENS (H, P),
HAPPENS (H, a))))A
FULFILL-CONDS-neg-TC(A, a)]])
As for purpose clauses, we want now conclude that, from the intentions and beliefs derived
from the utterance of a neg-TC imperative, H will derive a further intention to do P
modified t o avoid a:
Axiom 6 INTEND(H, P, q) A BEL(H, AVOID (IN (HAPPENS (H, P), HAPPENS(H, a))))

3P' [INTEND(H, PI, q) A
CONSTRAINED(Pt, P, AVOID (IN (HAPPENS (H, P), HAPPENS (H, a)))]
As I said, this is just a first attempt to model neg-TC imperatives, and there are several
problems with it. One is the AVOID operator that I introduced above: it is not clear what
it exactly means. One alternative would be to model a as a condition not to be satisfied
by P, a condition that could be taken care of by FULFILL-CONDS(B, P).

Another problem is that Axiom 5 requires that B be known. This is the case when the
neg-TC imperative is contained in an adjunct, so that B is the action described in the
corresponding matrix clause. However, if the neg-TC imperative is contained in a matrix
clause, it is not known a priori what B is: H has to understand t o which B A relates.

5.1.3

Further work on t h e model

For the time being, I have simply - and very roughly! - sketched axioms for modeling particular
kinds of imperatives. Some issues that clearly need t o be addressed are:
1. Refine the formalization, making sure that it actually models the imperatives as they
should be modeled - for example, I pointed out that the applicability of Axiom 3 should
be restricted, that Axiom 4 should probably restated as an assumption, and that there
are problems with Axiom 5. I also have t o define CONSTRAINED, CONTRIBUTES,
CONTRIBUTESl and AVOID. For example, the operator AVOID may be expressible
by means of the already defined action constructors and modal operators; however, this
doesn't seem possible as long as there is no way of expressing simultaneity between actions,
in the sense of being able t o express While doing P, do (or don't do) a.
2. The treatment of time is a bit simplistic, as [Allen, 19901 remarks. I have t o check what
time properties I need in my model: I already mentioned simultaneity.

3. Finally, I need t o make sure that H's intentions as inferred by means of the axioms I
propose and as depicted in the plan graph are consistent and compatible with each other.
For example, the plan graph may include actions that are not explicitly mentioned in
the input instructions - what is the status of such actions with respect t o the intentions
inferred from the axioms?

5.2

The action representation formalism

I will start by making some observations on the features that an action representation formalism
should include t o be adequate to model NL descriptions of actions - these observations rest on the
analysis of purpose clauses and negative imperatives that I presented in the previous chapters,
and on analysis of other constructions, such as free adjuncts and check constructions, on which
I reported elsewhere [Webber and Di Eugenio, 19901. Notice that in the whole discussion action
is meant as action type, and action description as action type description.
I n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n descriptions.
1. It has probably become obvious by now, but let me point out that, like individuals,
sets of individuals, propositions [Bach, 19901 etc. actions should be part of the underlying ontology of the representation formalism. This has also been advocated by
Jackendoff, who includes A C T I O N among his ontological categories and justifies it
by means of our ability to refer to an action - I did it, or to ask questions about
them - W h a t did you do? [Jackendoff, 19831.
2. Action descriptions can always be further specified. Consider:

Ex. 46

a) Apply paste to the wall.
b) Using a paint roller or brush, apply paste t o the wall.
c ) Using a paint roller or brush, apply paste to the wall,
starting at the ceiling line and pasting down a few feet and
covering an area a few inches wider than the width of the fabric.

Therefore the formalism must be able to deal with action description that may not exactly correspond to the stored knowledge, and it must be able t o support computation
of relations between action descriptions that differ in level of specificity.

3. The formalism must be able t o represent not just the usual participants in an action
such as agent or patient, but also means, manner, direction, extent etc.
Relations between actions. The formalism must be able to represent various relations between actions, such as temporal relations, generation and enablement.

Another relation that the formalism should be able to account for is test, relating two
actions one of which is a test on the outcome or execution of the other. Consider:

Ex. 47 To attach the wires to the new switch, use the paper clip to move the springtype
clip aside and slip the wires into place. Tug gently on each wire t o make sure it's secure.

Such constructions are fairly frequent in instructions: they are marked by verbs such as
check, make sure, be certain ... plus a subordinate clause introduced by the complementizer
that which describes a state a. They are used to tell H t o check whether a certain state
a holds; pragmatically, they also alert H t o the fact that, if a doesn't hold, he should do
something t o bring a about.
In Ex. 47, the purpose clause of the second sentence provides a constraint on the outcome of
attaching wires to the new switch -that the attachment be secure. Notice that, consistently
with my analysis of purpose clauses, tug gently on each wire generates make sure it's secure.
In this example, the corrective action is not explicit.
In Cohen and Levesque's logic there is an operator for test, " ?". However, " ?" is applied
to states of the world, not to pairs of actions. Including the test relation in my formalism
is left for future work.
It seems t o me that knowledge about individual actions is typically definitional, while knowledge about relations between actions is not. The problem is how to represent these different
kinds of knowledge.
The first possible solution would of course be t o adopt a uniform representation system, and
therefore disregard such difference; however, this would not take advantage of the different inference mechanisms that are associated with different kinds of knowledge. Consider the following
instruction:
Ex. 48 Cut the square along a perpenclicular axis to create two triangles.
The relation between cut the square along a perpendicular axis and create two triangles is at
least odd, if not ill-formed, because cutting a square along an axis won't create two triangles.

However, the two action descriptions by themselves are perfectly well-formed. In order t o track
down the ill-formedness above, a homogeneous representation system that does not support
distinguishing between different kinds of knowledge could e.g. try to prove that cut the square
along a perpendicular axis is not a well-formed description, a clearly undesirable behavior.
I will therefore propose t o capture definitional information about actions by means of the
T-Box of a hybrid system - see next section - and information about relations between actions
by means of an action library. The semantic primitives of such representation will be the same
that Jackendoff defines as part of Conceptual Structures.
In the following, I will first describe hybrid systenls, and show that they facilitate computing
the first kind of accommodation, namely, inferring a more specific description of an action; then
describe Jackendoff's Conceptual Structures, and show how such representation can express
knowledge about individual actions, and ultimately t o compute the second kind of accommodation, namely, inferring assumptions. Finally, I will show why their integration is necessary.

5.2.1

Hybrid Systems

Hybrid Knowledge Representation systems, such as KRYPTON [Brachman et al., 1983b1, KLTWO [Vilain, 19851, and CLASSIC [Brachman et aI., 19901, stemmed from the KL-ONE formalism [Brachman and Schmolze, 19851. They are composed of two parts: a terminological part, or
T-Box, that is used to define terms, and an assertional part, or A-Box, used to assert facts or
beliefs.
All T-Box information is definitional in nature. The T-box language has two main categories,
concepts and roles, roughly corresponding t o frames and slots. Concepts are organized in a
hierarchy of structured terms. The relation between terms in the hierarchy is subsumption,
which captures the notion that all instances of the subsumed concept are by definition instances
of its subsuming concepts.
The T-Box is equipped with a classification algorithm, which takes a concept and determines
the subsumption relations between it and all the other concepts in a given Knowledge Base. By
means of the classification algorithm, a new concept can be automatically assimilated into the
taxonomy by "placing it in the right place", i.e. linking it t o its most specific subsumers and its
most general subsumees. Given that the classification algorithm is able to deal with concepts it
has never seen before, the T-Box can be seen as an infinite virtual lattice.
The A-box uses first-order logic
and T-Box share a symbol table).

7.

The terms of this logic are defined in the T-Box (A-box

To adapt such structures to representing actions, verb phrases have t o map to concepts in
the T-Box. In the T-box that I will construct, verbs will be concepts decomposed according t o
Jackendoff's Conceptual Structures.
The A-Box will contain assertions about "individuals", which will be the instances of concepts
obtained as a result of the parsing process s .
7The A-Box language is generally somewhat restricted, for example function-free, in order to make theorem
proving computationally tractable.
'Here assertions should be understood as regarding the content of the NL input, and individuals are individual
action descriptions, not action tokens - this approach is similar to the one adopted in PSI-KLONE [Brachman et
al., 19791.

I will also develop a third box, an action library, which will be devoted to representing
the rest of the knowledge about actions, such as knowledge of the effects expected to occur
when an action of a given type is performed, and information about relations between actiontypes: temporal, generation, enablement, testing. This knowledge can be seen as common
sense planning knowledge, which includes facts such as t o loosen a screw, you have to turn it
counterclockwise, but not complex recipes to achieve a certain goal [Balkanski, 19901, such as
how t o assemble a piece of furniture. I would like to stress that the knowledge encoded in
the action library relates to individual action descriptions and their relations t o one another,
basically t o the individual blocks that should be used to build more complex plans; such plans
will be contained in the plan library, with which I am not currently concerned.
Accommodation: computing more specific actions

A question that needs to be answered at this point is: why use a hybrid KR system, with
the added complexity that classification involves, instead of using a simpler representation augmented with an inheritance mechanism? The answer is that in fact I need the power of classification to provide the flexibility to deal with concepts that don't exactly correspond to the
stored knowledge.
Let's go back to Ex. 6 - Cut the square i n half to create two triangles.
Consider a T-Box such as the one shown in Fig. 5.1 - notice that, to keep things simple, I
have used intuitively appealing names for concepts and roles: this T-Box is not expressed in
Jackendoff's terms, and some of the names I use, such as location and result, are not linguistically
well motivated either.
Given Ex. 6 as input, the individual action description a - cut (the) square i n half - will
be asserted in the A-Box and recognized as an instance of the concept cut and as an abstraction
of y - cut (a) square i n half along the diagonal, as shown in Fig. 5.2. At this point, inference
mechanisms that I will describe in more detail later will infer that the action to be performed
is actually y and not a: this can be inferred by exploiting the context in which a appears. The
context is composed by ,f3 (the goal create two triangles), the fact that y generates ,f?, and the
position of a in the T-Box, in particular its position with respect to y. This implements one of
the two kinds of accommodation that I described in ch. 2 - see fig. 2.2.
Notice that by exploiting the classification process we can also deal with cases in which a
is more specific than y, or in which a is in conflict with y, such as in Ex. 48. In this case we
can recognize that y = cut the square i n half along the diagonal and a = cut the square along a
perpendicular axis are in conflict, because the role fillers of location on a and y are non-unifiable,
being along(perpendicu1ar-axis) and along(diagona2) respectively. I am not planning t o address
the issue of what strategies should be adopted in case such a conflict is detected: presumably,
some kind of interaction with the user could be triggered.
In conclusion, given Do a to do p, and a stored generation relation GEN(y,
see sect. 5.2.3 on the representation of generation and enablement:

P , agent, t ) -

1. If y is an ancestor of a , a is the action to be performed.

2. If a is an ancestor of y , we can assume that y is the action t o be performed.
'AS I already mentioned, I assume there is a discourse model that takes care of definite reference etc.
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Figure 5.2: Dealing with less specific action descriptions

3. If cr and y are not ancestors of each other, but they can be unified - i.e. all the information
they provide is compatible, as in the case of cut the square carefully and cut the square in
half along the diagonal - then their unification cr U y is the action t o be executed.
4. If cr and y are not ancestors of each other, and they provide conflicting information - such
as cut the square along the axis and cut the square along the diagonal then signal failure.
This could trigger interaction with the user.
-

5.2.2

Jackendoff's Collceptual Structures

Work done in lexical semantics, in particular Jackendoff's Conceptual Structures [Jackendoff,
19901, proves to be very useful to represent action descriptions in a linguistically motivated way,
as [Di Eugenio and White, 19911 shows. As we will see, there is significant mileage to be gained
from using a decompositional theory of meaning, because the semantic primitives do manage
t o capture important generalizations. In the rest of this section, I will introduce the notation
and some minor modifications to the theory as presented in [White, 19911, and I will apply the
notation to the representation of the clause Go into the other room lo.
In Jackendoff's theory, an entity may be of ontological type Thing, Place, Path, Event, State,
Munner or Property. The conceptual structure for a room is shown in (5.2a) below:

Square brackets indicate an entity of type Thing meeting the enclosed featural description.
Small caps indicate atoms in conceptual structure, which serve as links t o other systems of
representation; for example, the conceptual structure for a kitchen (5.2b) differs from that of a
room only in its choice of constant. Jackendoff leaves the determination of their similarities and
differences t o a system of representation better suited t o the task, able t o address perceptual
distinctions.
To distinguish instances of a type, in [Zwarts and Verkuyl, 19911 it is required that every
conceptual structure have an index, as in (5.3):

Conceptual structures may also contain complex features generated by conceptual functions
over other conceptual structures. For example, the conceptual function IN: Thing + Place may
be used t o represent the location i n the room as shown in (5.4a) below. Likewise, the function
TO: Place + Path describes a path that ends in the specified place, as shown in (5.4b):

( 5 . 4 ~ )is an equivalent representation of (5.4b), where the index l stands for the entire constituent. This move considerably lessens the typographical burden of representing large con''All modifications to Jackendoff's theory have been developed by Mike White.

ceptual structures; t o further lessen this burden, indices and ontological types will often be left
out.
To complete our clausel1, it remains only to add the conceptual function GO: Thing x Path
+ Event:

As there is no explicit subject in our clause, the constituent i (pragmatically, the AGENT)in
(5.5) is left unspecified.
To distinguish Walk into the other room from (5.5)) an indication of manner should be
included:12

The final modification t o Jackendoff's theory is the addition of a new semantic field. Semantic
fields, such as Spatial and Possessional, are intended t o capture the similarities between sentences
like Jack went into the other room and The gift went to Bill, as shown in (5.7) below:

The idea is that verbs like go leave the semantic field underspecified, whereas verbs like donate
specify a particular field. In addition to these semantic fields, White proposes to add a new
one called Control. It is intended t o represent the functional notion of having control over some
object. For example, in sports, the meanings of having the ball, keeping the ball, getting the
ball, and losing the ball embody this notion, and are clearly quite distinct from their Spatial
and Possessional counterparts. The inclusion of this new field let's us capture these additional
similarities in an analogous way. The similarity between Jack has the money and Jack has the
ball, for instance, is shown in (5.8):

5.2.3

The action library

The action library contains both simple plans that represent common sense knowledge about
individual actions, and relations such as generation and enablement between individual actions.
These plans are used as building blocks that can be manipulated to form more complex plans,
that will be contained in a separate plan library.
llIgnoring, of course, t h e meaning of other for now.
12Though this i s clearly intended, Jackendoff never explicitly represents such a distinction.
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Figure 5.3: A Move Something Sonzewhere Action.
Individual actions

I will refer t o the move-action library entry shown in Figure 5.3, which might be described as
follows: go t o where j is, get control over i t , then take it t o 1 - from [Di Eugenio and White,
1991].13
Actions have a header and a body, both expressed in terms of Jackendoff's semantic primitives.
The terminology, header and body, is reminiscent of STRIPS [Fikes and Nilsson, 19711; however
I express the relations between these components in terms of enublement and generation-for
example the body generates its header.
T h e representation does not employ preconditions, because preconditions concern states,
but instructions describe actions far more frequently than states. More importantly, it is very
13This do-it-yourself method is but one way to move something from where it is to somewhere else. Other
methods would be listed separately in the action library.

difficult to draw the line between what is a precondition and what is part of the body of the
action. One could say that the body of a move-action simply consists of a transfer of an object
from one place to another; and that a precondition for a move-action is having control over
that object. However, consider a heavy object: the agent will start exerting force to lift i t , and
then carry it to the other location. It is not obvious whether the lifting action is still part of
achieving the precondition, or already part of the body. Therefore, my point of view is that there
are only actions, which may be substeps in executing another action - namely, they may belong
t o a sequence that generates the header 14. Actually, the name sequence may be misleading,
because it conveys the idea of a total temporal order holding between the actions belonging
t o the sequence. Actions in a body may have other relations holding between them, such as
enablement in Fig. 5.3, and the order may be partial. The annotations on the body specify the
relations between the subactions.
From the planning tradition, I retain the notions of qualifiers and eflects. Qualifiers are
conditions that make an action relevant: for example, unplug x is relevant only if x is plugged.
Qualifiers are useful for computing assumptions-see sec. 5.2.3.
Notice the importance of using a representation such as Jackendoff's: it helps us capture the
common characteristics of different actions, e.g. get and carry. The semantic representation for
carry would also match the generic move-action template, and would add to it a qualification
such as
(9)

[ ~ a n n e rw I T H ( [ ~ h i n
HANDS])]
~

Having such a representation is also useful for computing qualifiers and effects in a systematic
way: they can be precompiled from the representation itself. For example, for every action
including a component S of j moving from where it is to 1 in its header, i.e.

we know that after S, j must be at 1, therefore we can include this in the effects of the action.
Given the further restriction that j cannot be in two places at once, we may infer that j cannot
be at 1 now, and thus precompute the qualifier.15

Relations between actions
We have already seen that relations such as generation, enablement and temporal relations are
used in the body of an action. Such relations, in particular generation, are also used t o express
simple common sense knowledge about actions, such as the simple plan to loosen a screw, turn
it counterclockwise 16. I will now discuss these relations in more detail.
a

Temporal relations: I will adopt relations derived from Allen's temporal logic [1984]. Notice
that the formalism must be able t o represent possibly underspecified temporal relations.
Consider:

'*On preconditions, see also Pollack's position [1986], which I discussed in ch. 3.
15
Jackendoff suggests something analogous with his inference rules, which have yet t o be formalized.
1 6 ~ h actions
e
appearing in these simple plans must be defined in other parts of t h e action library.
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Ex. 49 Pour mixture over cheese in casserole, spreading evenly.
Although this description can be seen as a single action (pouring having spreading as a
side-effect) or as two separate actions, consider it from the latter point of view. It is
clear that spreading has t o begin after pouring has begun, but the temporal relationship
.of the two actions is not otherwise constrained. An agent could pour the mixture and,
after having poured it, spread it; or hold the receptacle that contains the mixture with
one hand, pouring it and simultaneously spreading the mixture with the other hand; or
pour the mixture and simultaneously have a second agent spread it. The choice, possibly
constrained by the state of the world, will be made at the moment of executing the action.
Such underspecificity can be represented in Allen's logic presumably by means of disjunction, e.g.

where BEFORE(t1, t 2 ) means that tl is before t 2 , and they don't overlap in any way;
OVERLAP(tl, t2) means that t l starts before t 2 , and they overlap.
a

Generation. Recall that the defining conditions for generation are: a and P are simultaneous, a is not part of doing P, and when a occurs, a set of conditions C hold, such that
the joint occurrence of a and C imply the occurrence of P.
As a starting point, I adopt the representation of generation put forward by Pollack
will modify it if the need arises:

-

I

Definition 5 GEN(a, P, agent, t )
(i) V agentl, Vtl [ HOLDS(C, tl) A OCCURS(a, agentl, tl)
3C[
-, OCCURS(P, agentl, tl)]
(ii) 3 agent2, 3t2 [OCCURS(a, agent2, t2) A
1 OCCURS(P, agent2, t2)]
(iii) 3 agent,, 3t3 [HOLDS(C, t3) A 1 OCCURS(P, agent3, t3)] A
(iv) HOLDS(C,t)]
The four clauses in Def. 5 read as follows:
(i) if condition C holds and action a occurs a t time tl, then action ,6 occurs a t the same
time tl;
(ii) a by itself doesn't entail
time t 2 ;

p, namely,

a can occur a t time t2 without ,f3 occurring at

(iii) condition C doesn't entail ,b' by itself, namely C may hold a t time t3 without
occurring a t time t3;

P

(iv) C holds a t time t .
Nobody has ever spelled out how to decide what conditions affect a given generation
relation. Such conditions are generally taken t o include the fact that an agent is in standard
conditions with respect t o a given action - for example, an agent whose feet are tied won't
be able t o go into the other room; and relevant conditions about the state of the world, for
example that, in order for flipping the switch t o generate turning the light on, all electrical

equipment must be working. I just want to point out that characteristics of the actions
taking part in a given generation relation should not be part of such conditions. It could
be in fact argued that some of these characteristics, e.g. along(diagona1) for cutting the
square, should be part of conditions on the generation relation. However, it would then
be impossible to choose in a principled way which features of an action belong to the
description of the action, and which belong to the conditions on generation. Moreover,
there are cases in which such features are implicit arguments of verbs. Turn has an intrinsic
argument, direction: therefore, counterclockwise has to be a specification of turn screw,
not a condition on the generation relation between turn screw and loosen screw.
Another observation on conditions: the assumptions I mentioned as an object that accommodation has to compute may again be seen as part of conditions on a given generation
relation. However, they seem to me to be of a different nature. In the Go into the other
room to get the urn of cofSee example l7 go into the other room may successfully contribute
to getting the urn of coflee even if there is no urn in the other room - if for example in
the other room there is a note saying how to get the urn of coffee. The assumption urn
i n the other room is simply an expectation that H comes t o have as a consequence of the
accommodation process.
Enablement. In ch. 3, I mentioned the following characteristics of enablement:
1. If a enables ,L?, a brings about a set of conditions that are necessary, but not sufficient,
for the subsequent execution of ,f?.

2. As a consequence, enablement embodies a notion of temporal precedence: if a enables
p, a has to temporally precede ,L?, namely, a has to begin, but not necessarily end,
before P: in the following example, hold has to continue for the whole duration of fill.

Ex. 50 Hold the cup under the spigot to fill it with cofSee.
3. In the same way that the generatee affects the execution of the generator, so the
enabled action affects the execution of the enabling action. to in go to the mirror
is interpreted differently, depending upon whether the action t o be enabled is seeing
oneself or carrying the mirror somewhere else.
To my knowledge, the only definition of enablement existing in the literature is Balkanski's
definition of conditional enablement. Balkanski's definition reflects her observation that
[1990, 11.261

A closer look at the enabling relation shows that the set of conditions brought
about by the occurrence of the enabling activity is necessary either to satisfy a n
executability constraint o n the enabled activity or provide the ... condition o n a
generation relation i n which the enabled activity participates.

Balkanski exemplifies the former type of enablement with buying ingredients enables preparing the dish, and the latter with inserting the dowels enables attaching the rails. Notice in
fact that inserting dowels brings about some conditions under which a third action, such
as hammering, generates attaching the rails. The formal definition is as follows:
I 7 ~ h iis
s an indirect generation relation; however, I think the point I am making holds for direct generation as
well.

Definition 6 CENABLES(a,

P, C1)

3 C2
(i) CGEN(a, ACHIEVE(C2), C1) A
CEXEC(P, C2) V 37 CGEN(y, P, Cz)]]

a is defined as enabling /3 if
1. a generates achieving C2, and

2. (i) either C2 has to hold for ,L? to be executable - CEXEC(P, C2). This is the case
for a = buying ingredients and /3 = preparing dish;
(ii) or there is a third action y that generates /3 under C2. This is the case for a =
inserting dowels, P = attach mils, y = hammer rails.

The notion of temporal precedence between a and /3 that enablement embodies is missing
in Def. 6, and is contained in a second definition - ENABLES - that builds on CENABLES
and that relates two activities. In fact, both Pollack and Balkanski assume two different
types for actions. The first is act-types, which don't have an associated performance time,
the second activities, defined as act-types plus an agent and a time interval. I have doubts
on the previous definitions of enablement and generation because I am not convinced that
distinguishing between act-types and activities is correct: for example, I don't agree with
giving more prominence to the agent role over the other arguments of the verb, as the
definition of activity seems to advocate.
However, as in the case of generation, I will start from this definition of enablement and I
will modify it as the need arises.
As I also mentioned in Ch. 3, the distinction between generation and enablement becomes blurred when we extend the concept of generation to a sequence of actions A
< a1, a 2 , ..., an > that generate another action P. Is the relation between a; E A and
,O generation or enablement? Consider for example the move-action in fig. 5.3: what is the
relation between the header - interpreted as get the urn of coffee - and the actions which
are part of its body, for example GO,,, namely, go into the other room? The answer seems
to stem from intuitions: if one sees the two actions as separate, one could say that go into
the other mom enables get the urn of coffee; otherwise, that go into the other room is part
of get the urn of coflee. The question seems even more difficult to answer if, instead of
considering a1 and P , one takes a; with i > 1: it seems very hard to say that a; enables

P.
I think that the only sensible way of answering such question is to do it with respect to the
formal representation: I will keep the term generation for a relation defined between two
actions, or between a sequence A < al,a2, ...,an > and an action p. In the latter case,
the relation between a; and ,O will be termed indirect genemtion - it will be called substep
in the plan graph. Enablement will instead hold of pairs of actions a; and a k , possibly
belonging to a sequence A generating 0.

Accommodation: Making an Assumption
In this section, I will show how the process of understanding Ex. 2 - Go into the other room to
get the urn of coffee, which requires the assumption that the urn is in the other room, is carried
out.

The process begins with the following representation

Is:

Here the FOR-function (derived from the to-phrase) encodes the CONTRIBUTES relation holding between the go-action cr and the get-action @.
Given the presence of the to phrase, we know that the go-action a may generate or enable the
get-action p. Given that no direct generation or enablement relation between the two is found,
the hypothesis that a may be part of a sequence of actions that generate /3 is put forward. This
hypothesis is pursued first of all by looking up the get-action in the action library: /3 matches
the header of the general move-action shown in Figure 5.3 if the object j t o be moved is bound
t o the urn of cofSee 19:

The next step is to try to match the go-action with some subaction y of the get-action:
the go-action can be understood t o be the first action yl in the get-action by taking [AT(j)]
and [IN([oTHER-ROOM])]
to be the same place. This is equivalent to making the following
assumption:

Assumption (5.10) could of course be wrong, say if there were a note in the next room saying
ha ha, it's not really in this mom but the next.
5.2.4

Integrating Hybrid Systems and Conceptual Structures

So far, I have shown that two different representation schema are useful t o perforni different
kinds of inferences. Moreover, each responds t o some of the desiderata I listed earlier: in
particular, a hybrid system provides the flexibility required in dealing with action descriptions
that don't exactly match the stored knowledge; a semantic representation such as Jackendoff's
is linguistically motivated and manages t o capture generalizations, such as that carry is a moveaction augmented with a specific physical means of moving the object.
Given that the two formalisms both show promise, the next natural step is t o integrate the
two. Both will benefit from this integration.
"This representation is constructed by a Combinatory Categorial Grammar parser - see [White, 19911 and
sect. 5.5.
lgNotice that the description the u r n of coffee actually refers to a discourse referent: I assume there is some
process responsible for the discourse model, as in fact happens in the AnimNL system - see sect. 5.5.

Defining terms in the T-Box by means of linguistically sound primitives will transform the
T-Box into a real lexicon.
On the other hand, a KL-ONE style representation will make it possible to use Conceptual
Structures in a computational framework, by endowing it with a hierarchical organization and
with the possibility of extending the lexicon. A flavor of hierarchical organization is present in
[Jackendoff, 19901 itself. Consider (5.2), repeated here for convenience:

ROOM and KITCHEN are atoms in Conceptual Structures, and so are many other entities, such
as LIQUID and W I N E . It could be argued that this is too high a level of atomicity: Jackendoff
postulates a type Thing which is a collection of atoms, including, for example, LIQUID and WINE.
Although he mentions that there are rules to determine that W I N E satisfies the feature L I Q U I D ,
he never goes into the algorithm for performing such computation. This can of course be done
by means of a taxonomy rooted in the concept thing. Liquid will be defined as a subconcept of
thing, and wine as a subconcept of liquid, e.g. by adding t o liquid the restriction made from
grapes.

By having such a taxonomy, we can also define a concept animate, and use it t o indicate
that the structural position corresponding t o agent is not thing but animate, as many theories
of action require.
Jackendoff defines all these concepts as atoms because they cannot be defined at the level
of Conceptual Structures: this is readily captured in KL-ONE by defining them as primitive
concepts, namely, concepts for which necessary but not sufficient conditions can be stipulated apart maybe from wine, as made from grapes can be considered as a defining condition.
A hierarchical organization is also very helpful to deal with actions that differ in M A N N E R ,
such as move and carry, which adds t o move the specification [M-,r
HANDS])],
or go,, and walk.
In fig. 5.4, I present part of a T-Box that includes the move-action shown in Fig. 5.3. There
are four taxonomies, rooted respectively in thing, place, path, event 20.

Thing. The taxonomy rooted in thing is very straightforward; here only the subconcepts animate and inanimate are shown.

Place. The concepts belonging t o this hierarchy correspond t o conceptual functions of the form
F: Thing -, Place. Some such functions are AT, IN, ON. In Fig. 5.4, I show only the
concept at-place, corresponding t o the AT conceptual function. at-place has a single role
at with exactly one filler, of type Thing.

Path. The concepts belonging to this hierarchy represent functions yielding Paths. The fromto-path concept has two roles, from and to, each of which has a filler place. from-to-path
corresponds t o the complex Conceptual Structure:

20

Jackendoff also defines state, manner, property. The respective hierarchies are not shown in fig. 5.4.

The concept from(at)-to-path restricts the role to inherited from from-to-path t o be filled
by at-place. It therefore corresponds t o

Event. Subtypes of event are cause and caused.
cause has two roles, the agent, restricted t o be animate, and the caused event.
The hierarchy rooted in caused will include all possible events that can be arguments to
the conceptual function CAUSE. Here I have shown part of the subhierarchy rooted in
go, which corresponds to the following conceptual function: GO: Thing x Path + Event.
The concept go has two roles: goer, which has thing as filler, and path, that has a path as
filler.
Subconcepts of go are gosp and goct,[. The concept gosp-from(at)-to restricts the role path
of go t o be a from(at)-to-path.
Finally, the concept move-j-to-1 is defined as a subconcept of cause by imposing the restriction that the filler of caused be gosp-from(&)-to. A final restriction is needed, indicated
by the role value map: the filler for the role found a t the end of one of the branches has
to be the same found a t the end of the other branch 21.
Notice that this definition of move-j-to-b exactly captures its Conceptual Structure definition, as shown in the header in Fig. 5.3, and repeated here for convenience:

I hope I have convinced the reader that mapping Conceptual Structures into KL-ONE like
primitives is rather straightforward, although the final result may not correspond t o the intuitions we have regarding those concepts - on the other hand, a Conceptual Structure representation of a verb is not very intuitive either!
The important question now is: with a classical predicate argument representation, such as
move(i, j, TO(l)), it is very easy t o classify new concepts. However, now the representation is
in a sense "multi-level": for example, 1, the place where to move j, is found navigating from
the concept move-j-to-1 through the role chain caused, path, at. I have to verify whether the
classifier is able to properly classify these "multi-level" concepts.

5.3

The plan graph

Finally, I want to discuss the third component of my model of instruction understanding, the
plan graph and the inferences that build it.
"In the CLASSIC system that I have been using, role value maps can be expressed by means of SAME-AS, in
this case SAME-AS (caused goer) (caused path at). It should be read as the filler of the role "goer" of "caused"
is the SAME-AS the filler of the role "at" of "path" of "causedJJ.

The plan graph represents the structure of the intentions that the agent adopts as a response
t o the instructions. It keeps track of the goals the agent is pursuing, of the hierarchical relations
between the goals and the actions the agent is going to execute to achieve such goals, and of
various relations between actions. It also helps in interpreting the instructions that follow. In
the following example, establishing the initial goal get the urn of coflee provides the context in
which the other instructions have to be interpreted:

Ex. 51

a ) G o into the other room to get the urn of coffee.
b) Before you pick it up, be sure that it's unplugged.
c ) W h e n you bring it back here, carry it with both hands.

A similar strategy is adopted for example by Kautz [1990]: however, he only uses two relations
between events, is-a and part-of, while my representation is richer. In Figure 5.5, the plan graph
built after interpreting the three instructions belonging to Ex. 51 is shown: in sect. 5.2.3, I have
discussed how the leftmost branch of the tree is built. The algorithms that build the other two
branches still need to be designed in detail.

A 1: BE(urn, IN([other-room]))
A2: BE(urn, plugged-in)
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Figure 5.5: The plan graph.

5.3.1

The data structure

The plan graph is composed of nodes that contain descriptions of individual actions, and arcs
that denote relations between these actions.
A node contains the Conceptual Structure representation of an action - not the whole entry
in the action library, only the header - augmented with the consequent state achieved after the
execution of that action; the consequent state is computed from the effects of the action, and is
needed for the interpretation of the instructions that follow. Notice that in Figure 5.5 the labels
on the nodes are only mnemonics, and do not represent their real contents.
The arcs represent various relations between actions. If a and
origin of R, R can be:

P are linked by R, with a the

1. Temporal, such as precedes in Fig. 5.5. Another temporal relation of interest is during,
that indicates simultaneity. Also, in future extensions to the plan graph in which states
are represented, an arc time will be used to Link an action and a state: its meaning is that
the action has to start when a given state comes t o hold - this would model instructions
such as turn the gas 08when the tofu has turned golden.

2. Generation and substep. Substep means that a belongs t o a sequence that generates
the sequence is composed by a single action, substep reduces t o generation.

P.

If

3. Enablement .
4. And, or. These arcs may be needed t o represent actions belonging t o a certain set: and
will link two actions that both have t o be performed, but that are totally unrelated t o one
another, such as Prepare a dessert and do laundry 22; two actions are linked by an or arc
if they are in alternative, such as vacuum or dust-mop the parquet, from Ex. 23.

There are assumptions associated with the plan graph. Some of those are derived from the
accommodation process; in this case, an assumption is associated to a relation between two
actions, and therefore, t o the corresponding arc in the plan graph-for example A1 in Fig. 5.5.
Other assumptions are derived from the qualifiers associated with actions, and are associated
with the nodes describing those actions-A2 in Fig. 5.5.

5.3.2

T11e algorithm

There are various inference processes that manipulate the plan graph, and that can be characterplan expansion, subgoding-and plan recognition-inferring the
ized as either planning-e.g.
more abstract goal some actions are supposed to achieve, performing accommodation inferences.
Some of these inferences can be made independently of the situation the agent finds him/herself
in, others instead require grounding the instructions in the current situation. For example, upon
observing that the door to the other room is closed, the agent will infer s/he needs t o perform
open the door. As I already said, the only inferences I am interested in are performed prior to
grounding the plan in the current situation. Given that the plan graph is used by the AnimNL
22The fact that they are unrelated may hold only a t the understanding level; when execution time comes, the
agent will possibly have to make choices, for example which action to execute first, or even which subactions to
interleave.

-

-

1) Add to A-Box individual(s) corresponding to Conceptual Structure
representation of action(s) described in input instructions.
Set flag ACCOM if they don't exactly match known concepts.
2) IF new utterance is simple imperative
THEN simple-imperative-procedure;
IF new utterance is Do-a-to-do-@
THEN Do-a-to-do-P procedure;
IF new utterance is DONT-imperative
THEN DONT-procedure;
IF new utterance is neg-TC-imperative
THEN negTC-procedure;
IF new utterance contains temporal subordinate
THEN TEMP-procedure;
IF new utterance is ...
THEN . . . .

Figure 5.6: The top-level algorithm

system, other modules expand the plan graph derived from the input instructions according t o
the current situation - see sect. 5.5.
The plan graph is built by an interpretation algorithm that works by keeping track of active
nodes - which will include the goal currently in focus, the nodes just added t o the tree, and
possibly other nodes.
The topmost level of the algorithm is very simple, as shown in Fig. 5.6. Given the conceptual
structure of the current instruction, it will create the corresponding individuals in the A-Box,
setting a flag ACCOM if they don't exactly match known concepts; then it will call the procedure
corresponding t o the syntactic structure of the input instruction.
Needless to say, the algorithm is far from being fully developed: this is where my individual
efforts and others' in the project come together. I consider myself responsible for the algorithms
pertaining t o purpose clauses and t o negative imperatives. Clearly many other problems have
t o be addressed, for example temporal inferences, or plan recognition inferences of the kind that
Kautz has proposed and that I described in sect. 2.
In the following, I present the algorithm for purpose clauses, and some ideas regarding the
one for negative imperatives. My working assumption is that the various procedures receive
in input a list of active nodes, so that they know in which subtree to insert the new structure
derived from the current input instruction.

The algorithm for "Do a to do

P"

Input: the individuals in A-box corresponding to Conceptual Structure representations of cw and
@, ACCOM, the current plan graph, and the list of active nodes.

1. Retrieve from the action library the simple plan(s) associated to L
,3 - definition(s) of which
p is the header, generation relations in which P is the generatee, enablement relations in
which ,D is the enablee.
2. If ACCOM is not set
(a) If there is a direct generation or enablement relation between a and P, augment plan
graph with the structure derived from it, after calling the procedure for computing
possible assumptions (compute-assumptions).
(b) If there is no such direct relation, recursively look for an indirect relation between
the two actions, namely, look for possible connections between a and the substeps in
the definitions for P - as I showed in sect. 5.2.3 for go into the other room and get the
urn of coffee. This step may require calling the procedure for computing assumptions
(compute-assumptions). Augment plan graph.

3. If ACCOM is set,
(a) if there is GEN(w, P, agent, t ) or ENABLES(w, P, agent, t), check whether
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

w is an ancestor of a : take a as the intended action;
w is a descendant of a : take w as the intended action.
w and a are unifiable: take the unified description w U a as the intended action.
if w and a are not unifiable because of disjoint role fillers, signal failure.

(b) If there is no direct generation or enablement relation between a and P, proceed as
in step 2b. Given that a is not known t o the system, use heuristics similar t o the
ones employed in 3a in order to find the relations between a and the substeps of P.

A point I haven't addressed in the algorithm is what to do when step 1 yields more than one
simple plan. In this case, the intended plan is the one which includes an action that matches
a. For example, there could be more than one plan indexed by get the urn of coffee; go into the
other room will help select those that include a physical movement on the part of the agent. If
after this selection step there still is more than one available plan, different hypotheses can be
pursued in parallel, or some measure of best "match" can be devised.

5.4

The algorithm for negative imperatives

So far, I have devoted far more attention to purpose clauses than to negative imperatives;
therefore, I will simply make some comments on the inferences needed for negative imperatives,
and on how the representation of the plan graph is affected by negative imperatives.
In the plan graph as defined so far, there is no provision for representing that an action should
NOT be performed. Remember also the difference between DONT and neg-TC imperatives: in
the former case the action a to be avoided is "independent", in the latter a is a side-effect or
an undesirable way of performing another action P. The very first thing that comes to mind is
t o introduce two new arcs, AVOID, and AVOID-IN. In Figs. 5.7 and 5.8, these arcs are used to
capture the difference between Exs. 45.a and .b, repeated here for convenience:

Ex. 52 a. Use a vinyl-to-vinyl paste for any type of border you plan t o hang over wallpaper. To
paste the border for hanging, cover the entire back with paste and book the strip; don't crease
the folds.
b. T o book the strip, fold the bottom third or more of the strip over the middle of the panel,
pasted sides together, taking care not to crease the wallpaper sharply at the fold.
As far as ATJOID is concerned, though, its meaning seems to amount to more than simply
avoid the action at the end of the arc. In Ex. 52.a, what has to be avoided is performing crease
on the result of book. If crease were executed, it would follow book: the AVOID arc has a
temporal flavor to it. In the case of Ex. 23, relative to cleaning the parquet, the actions to be
avoided, e.g. scrub, are alternative ways to generate the goal clean the parquet: the AVOID
arc in this case should capture that scrub would generate clean parquet, if it were executed. As
a first working hypothesis, I will then assume that the arcs gen, temporal relations, substep,
enables have a corresponding AVOID arc - given that these is a very tentative solution, I am
representing the AVOID arcs as dashed lines.
In ch. 4, I also mentioned, with respect to Ex. 23, that an algorithm similar to Kautz's could
be used in this case, after adapting it to a representation based on GEN - in which we have for
example
GEN(vacuum(agent , floor), clean(agent , floor), agent, t ),
GEN(scrub(agent, floor), clean(agent, floor), agent, t )
A possible plan graph for a simplified version of Ex. 23 is shown in fig. 5.9.

5.5

Application: Animation from Instructions

The application system in which my work is grounded is the Animation from Natural Language
(AnimNL) project at the University of Pennsylvania.
Over the years, Penn7s Graphics Laboratory has developed an extensive model-based animation system. The system embodies anthropometric, kinematic and dynamic models, so that
agents of different builds and strengths can be animated to perform tasks such as grasp, look at,
stand up, sit down etc.
Given such model-based animation, it makes sense to envision a system where agents are
given goals to achieve, or instructions t o perform. Such a system could be used, among other
things, to instruct human agents on how to perform a task; as an aid to designers, e.g. to
check that the product is designed correctly for maintenance and repair; as an aid t o instruction
manuals writers, e.g. to ensure that their instructions are understandable.
Given the wide variety of possible users and applications for such a system, the most suitable
and flexible language for interacting with the animated agent is Natural Language, as it is the
only communication source accessible t o users other than programming-wise animators [Badler
et al., 1990; Levison, 1991; Webber et al., 19911.
Fig. 5.10 represents the architecture of the system. Referring to the figure, the part of diagram above the action gate represents the understanding and reasoning process an agent engages
in prior to any commitment to action, and has as a result, a generation of such commitment.
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Figure 5.9: The clean parquet example

Instructions are given to AnimNL in steps consisting of one or more utterances. A step
specifies a continuous behavior the agent must attend to - Ex. 51 is one such step. Steps are
processed by a parser that uses a Combinatory Categorid Grammar [White, 19911, and produces
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developed into the plan graph, by means of processes of plan inference, planning and plan
grounding. The inferences I discussed in this proposal mainly belong t o the plan inference box.
Clearly, the nodes in the plan graph as shown in fig. 5.5 are not sufficiently specified to drive
a simulator. First of all the plan needs t o be ground into the particulars of the perceptually
knowable environment: further planning will enable nodes of the plan graph t o become more
and more detailed.
When an intention becomes sufficiently specified for the agent to be ready t o commit t o it,
the intention is gated, triggering another, low-level planning process - the part below the "action
gate" in fig. 5.10. This low-level planning process takes care of postural planning, namely, of
planning how the agent can bring himself in a position in which he can perform the requested
action. Work being done by Jung [I9911 is aimed at planning the postures needed in the course of
satisfying an action. Finally, animation directives are sent t o YAPS, the simulator - in fig. 5.10,
Jack is the graphics system supporting animation.

5.6

Proposed work

Finally, I would like to summarize the work I am proposing to do on the model of instruction
understanding.
a

Theoretic part.
-

The speaker / hearer's model: extend and verify the axioms I wrote, and define
various predicates such as CONSTRAINED, CONTRIBUTES, AVOID.

- Give proper and accurate definitions for generation and enablement.
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Figure 5.10: The architecture of the AnimNL system

- Develop adequate inferences for negation.
- Study how applicable the accommodation inferences are. Do the two types I developed with regard t o purpose clauses - computing a more specific description of an
action, and computing assumptions on the basis of which a given relation between
two actions goes through - need to be integrated? may it happen that a whole
structure composed of a goal and other actions needs t o be integrated in the plan
graph? do these inferences have broader application, for example t o cases in which
the goals are not explicitly given? How do the inferences necessary for negation relate
to the ones developed for purpose clauses?
a

Implement at ion.

- Integrate hybrid systems and Conceptual Structures - I have been using the CLASSIC
system [Brachman et al., 19901 so far. The main question that needs t o be addressed is
whether the classification algorithm implemented in CLASSIC can deal with "multilevel" concept definitions.
- Develop and implement a more precise algorithm t o deal with purpose clauses and
in particular with negative imperatives. An issue that needs to be dealt with is the
updating of the list of active nodes in the plan graph. Another is the representation
of actions that should not be executed in the plan graph: rather than having a single
AVOID arc, the solution may be having different arcs, corresponding t o the relation
- e.g. generation, enablement etc - that the action a to be avoided would bear to
another action in its context, if a were executed.

Chapter 6

Conclusions
The purpose of this proposal is to put forward the following claim:

most instructions don't exactly mirror the agent's knowledge, but are understood by accommodating them in the context of the general plan the agent is considering; the agent's accommodation
process is guided by the goal(s) that s/he is trying to achieve. The concept of goal itself is pervasive in NL instructions, and a NL system which interprets instructions must be able to recognize
and/or hypothesize goals, keep tmck of them, and use them in computing the description of the
action to be performed.
I hope I managed to convince the reader that such claim is justified. The evidence I provided
rests on the analysis of naturally occurring instructions, and in particular of positive imperatives
containing purpose clauses, and of negative imperatives.
The analysis of purpose clauses has allowed me to show that goals do direct inference processes. I defined two inference processes pertaining to accommodation: computing a more
specific action description and computing the expectations H builds upon hearing or reading a
certain instruction.
The analysis of purpose clauses also has important consequences for the characteristics that
an action representation formalism should have: computing more specific action descriptions
requires that the formalism be flexible enough t o recognize different levels of specificity; the
relations between actions that purpose clauses embody are generation and enablenient, that
must therefore be included in the representation formalism.
The analysis of negative imperatives has shown that there are two classes of negative imperatives, DONT and neg-TC imperatives, that perform different pragmatic functions. They
differ in the expectations that S has on the intentions H will adopt, and in the relation existing
between the negated action and other actions in the context.
On the basis of the analysis of these data, I define a computational model of instructions
consisting of three components, an axiomatic formalization of the communicative act taking
place between S and H, an action representation formalism, and inference processes that build
the structure of H's intentions.
More in detail,
1. The speaker

/

hearer model of imperatives is based on Cohen and Levesque's model,

which accounts for the intentions H adopts in response t o S's utterance. I extended it by
providing axioms that model purpose clauses, DONT and neg-TC imperatives.
2. The action representation formalism integrates hybrid knowledge representation systems
and Conceptual Structures. I showed that the former are useful t o compute one kind of
accommodation, and the latter facilitates computing the other kind of accommodation. I
showed that a T-Box can be easily expressed in Conceptual Structure terms.

3. I discussed the data structure adopted for the plan-graph, and sketched an algorithm that
builds it.
A lot of work remains t o be done, including:
For the theoretic part,
-

-

Extend and verify the axioms I wrote to extend the speaker / hearer's model, and
define various predicates such as CONSTRAINED, CONTRIBUTES, AVOID.
Give proper and accurate definitions for generation and enablement.

- Develop adequate inferences for negation.
- Study how applicable the accommodation inferences are. Do the two types I developed with regard t o purpose clauses - computing a more specific description of an
action, and computing assumptions on the basis of which a given relation between
two actions goes through - need t o be integrated? may it happen that a whole
structure composed of a goal and other actions needs t o be integrated in the plan
graph? do these inferences have broader application, for example t o cases in which
the goals are not explicitly given? How do the inferences necessary for negation relate
to the ones developed for purpose clauses?
For the implement ation,
-

Integrate hybrid systems and Conceptual Structures - I have been using the CLASSIC
system [Brachman et al., 19901 so far. The main question that needs to be addressed is
whether the classification algorithm implemented in CLASSIC can deal with "multilevel" concept definitions.

- Develop and implement a more precise algorithm t o deal with purpose clauses and
in particular with negative imperatives. An issue that needs to be dealt with is the
updating of the list of active nodes in the plan graph. Another is the representation
of actions that should not be executed in the plan graph: rather than having a single
AVOID arc, the solution may be having different arcs, corresponding t o the relation
- e.g. generation, enablement etc - that the action cr t o be avoided would bear t o
another action in its context, if cr were executed.
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